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MONEY FOR NOTHING, YOUR CRISES FOR FREE?: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
POLICIES IN POST-1997 SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND 
Jasper Kim† and Kemavit Bhangananda†† 
Abstract: Both the South Korean and Thai governments encouraged consumer 
credit card usage to boost consumer spending and reinvigorate the national economy 
following the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  Today, almost a decade following the 
crisis, the authors provide a comparative analysis of how policymakers in both South 
Korea and Thailand have attempted to regulate the rapid upsurge in consumer credit card 
debt in their respective economies.  This Article also notes some of the benefits and risks 
of the approaches taken by the South Korean and Thai governments, using as focal points 
the South Korean government’s Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act, a personal debt 
relief program introduced by the Thai Ministry of Finance in 2005, and a series of Bank 
of Thailand credit card regulations. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis (“1997-98 Crisis”), South 
Korea 1  and Thailand have witnessed a rapid growth of the credit card 
industry and increasing levels of bad debt as a result of such growth.  South 
Korea, in particular, has become a nation of massive credit card defaulters.  
In 2003, nearly ten percent of the entire Korean population (approximately 
four million individuals) defaulted on their personal credit card debts or 
loans. 2   Representative Lee Han-koo of South Korea’s main opposition 
Grand National Party declared that one out of every 8.4 employed Koreans 
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1
 For purposes of this article, “South Korea,” “ROK,” and “Korea” (and any derivation thereof) 
shall collectively refer to the Republic of Korea. 
2
 John Larkin, The House of Cards, TIME, Dec. 1, 2003, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,552170,00.html. 
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are credit defaulters, 3  despite strong government efforts to curb the 
problem.4  In 2002-2003, Korean households held an average household 
debt of approximately 27,000 U.S. dollars (“USD”).5  In 2006, Korea ranked 
second in credit card use (slightly behind Britain) with sixty-eight percent 
credit card use penetration, eighty-three million cards in circulation, and 3.6 
trillion Korean won (“KRW”) (USD 3.6 billion) in transaction volume.6  At 
the same time, new personal bankruptcy filings totaled 122,608 in 2006, 
nearly triple the previous year’s total of 38,773 and a staggering ninety-fold 
increase from 2002, according to the Korean Supreme Court.7 
Following the 1997-98 Crisis, the Korean government spurred 
consumer credit card use through two proposed solutions to boost domestic 
consumer spending.8  The first government initiative provided incentives for 
consumers to use credit cards, such as a twenty percent income tax 
deduction for those whose credit card expenditures totaled more than ten 
percent of his or her annual income.9  The second government initiative 
provided deregulatory incentives to consumer credit card issuing institutions, 
including the lifting of long-held restrictions against cash advances.10 
Shortly after 1997-98, South Korea’s economy experienced a decrease 
in consumer domestic spending. 11   Beginning in 1999, however, the 
government spurred consumer spending by promoting the use of credit cards.  
                                           
3
 “Credit default” is defined as having over 300,000 Korean won (“KRW”), approximately 300 U.S. 
dollars (“USD”), in overdue debt for more than three months or, alternatively, having three “cases” upon 
which payments were overdue.  Conversions from KRW to USD are calculated using the currency 
exchange rate of KRW 1000 per USD. 
4
 Yoon Ja-young, 2.9 Million Credit Defaulters Still Threat to Economy, KOREA TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2006. 
5
 Id. 
6
 Na Jeong-ju, Korea Ranks 2nd in Credit Card Use, KOREA TIMES, Dec. 14, 2006 (stating that 
South Korea’s credit card use was higher than use in the United States (65%), Hong Kong (58%), 
Singapore (44%), and Taiwan (36%)). 
7
 See Supreme Court of Korea website, http://www.scourt.go.kr/scourt_en/Proceedings/t04_08/ 
index.html.  See also Bankruptcy Filings Tripled in 2006, JOONGANG DAILY, Jan. 8, 2007, at 5. 
8
 The government initiatives effectively created the consumer credit card market, given that one of 
the two initiatives involved the deregulation of cash advances, which is what credit cards were classified as 
prior to 1999. 
9
 See Larkin, supra note 2. 
10 
 Id. 
11
 The reasons for this were twofold.  First, many Koreans saw their purchasing power drop 
substantially during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis (“1997-98 Crisis”), which directly translated into 
fewer consumer purchases.  Second, many Korean industries during the 1997-98 Crisis were forced into 
bankruptcy, which increased unemployment rates and dramatically deflated consumer confidence.  Thus, in 
the post-1997-98 Crisis economic environment, until 1999 when consumers faced the decision of spending 
now or not spending at all, consumers generally chose simply not to spend.  After 1999, there was an 
increase in consumer spending.  See generally, James Crotty & Kang-kook Lee, The Effects of Neoliberal 
“Reforms” on the Post-Crisis Korean Economy, 38 REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 669, 672 
(2006), available at http://rrp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/38/4/669. 
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As a result, consumer spending behavior dramatically changed so that 
individuals spent money on credit in a far greater proportion than ever 
imagined by policymakers and credit-lending institutions.  This ultimately 
led to binge credit spending in the form of credit repayment delinquencies 
and debtor defaults.12 
Similarly, Thai policy makers have widely acknowledged the key role 
that personal consumption and the liberalization of retail credit played in 
reviving the Thai economy after the 1997-98 Crisis.13  Many have noted that 
Korea and Thailand share a broad pattern in that both are recovered 
economies driven in large part by domestic spending.  Others have argued 
that the similarities between the two countries endorsing credit card 
spending as a main cure for the economy are limited in several respects.14  
Nevertheless, Thailand witnessed rapid growth in its domestic credit card 
industry from 2001 to 2003, the same time period in which South Korea also 
witnessed rapid domestic credit card growth.  The year 2002 alone saw a 
119% increase in the number of credit cards in circulation.15  While growth 
has since slowed, the year-on-year number of cards in circulation climbed by 
fourteen percent in 2006 continuing a trend of annual double digit 
increases.16 
Following such developments, and despite tighter regulations from the 
Bank of Thailand (“BOT”) to cope with such rapid growth,17  observers 
                                           
12
 See ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 13 (2003), http://www.adb.org/ 
documents/books/ado/2003/kor.asp. 
13
 See M.R. Pridiyathorn Devakula, Governor, Bank of Thailand, Address at the British Chamber of 
Commerce-Thailand Special Luncheon: Thailand: Recent Economic Performance and the Road Ahead, 
(Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/ 
Speeches/english_version/speech_Governor&deputyGovE.htm. 
14
 Yunyong Thaicharoen et al., Rising Thai Household Debt: Assessing the Risks and Policy 
Implications 56 (Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper, Nov. 2004). 
15
 In the fourth quarter of 2002, there were approximately 5.6 million cards circulated in Thailand 
compared with the fourth quarter of 2001 during which the number was approximately 2.5 million.  Bank 
of Thailand, Financial Data of Commericial Banks, http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/ 
Financial_Institutions/New_Fin_Data/CB_Menu_E.htm (scroll down to line 15 “Credit Card Data 
Classified by Types of Cards”; then select “(Q) 1999-2004” in that line’s drop-down menu to download a 
spreadsheet containing the data) (last visited Dec. 3, 2007). 
16
 See Credit Card Usage in April Reaches 20.58%, KRUNGTHEP TURAKIJ, June 13, 2006, at 13. 
17
 See The Bank of Thailand, Notification of the Bank of Thailand Re: Rules, Procedures and 
Conditions to Undertake Credit Card Business of Commercial Banks, dated Mar. 23, 2004; The Bank of 
Thailand, Notification of the Bank of Thailand Re: Rules, Procedures and Conditions to Undertake Credit 
Card Business of Credit Card Business Operators, dated Mar. 4, 2005 [hereinafter, and collectively, the 
2004 BOT Regulation].  The first Notification is applicable to all local commercial banks and all branches 
of foreign commercial banks while the latter is applicable to all non-bank credit card companies.  Although 
the latter Notification was issued in 2005, their substantive content is almost identical to each other and the 
authors think referring to them collectively should suffice our referencing purpose and will note otherwise 
when separation between the two is necessary. 
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ranging from research bodies18 to Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 
voiced concerns regarding the surge in credit card usage.19  In October 2005, 
the Thai Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) unveiled an extremely controversial 
personal debt restructuring measure (“PDRM”) that was widely reported in 
the press as targeting a fifty percent reduction of debt principal and a 
complete interest write-off (i.e., 100%)20 of qualified personal and credit 
card loans.21  As reported, the PDRM would have wiped out seven billion 
Thai baht (“THB”) in debt principal and twenty billion THB in accrued 
interest22 (approximately USD 675 million for the total debt amount of THB 
twenty-seven billion).23  When subsequently released, though, the official 
text of the PDRM contained express language excluding credit card debt.24  
Nevertheless, during the period between the MOF announcement and the 
release of the official text, confusion existed regarding exactly which types 
of consumer debt the PDRM would cover and senior executives of Thai 
commercial banks gathered to voice their uniform concern relating to the 
potential for moral hazard. 25   As with Korea’s Individual Debtor 
Rehabilitation Act (“IDRA”), 26  eligibility for the PDRM is limited to 
qualified individuals.  By failing to include a steady salary as one of the 
                                           
18
 See Chatrudee Theparat, NESDB Concerned About Debt, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 21, 2005. 
19
 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Radio Broadcast: Prime Minister Thaksin Meets the People 
(May 28, 2005) (during which the prime minister opined on current affairs). 
20
 For instance, assuming owed amounts totaling 400 Thai baht (“THB”) (i.e., THB 100 in principal 
and THB 300 in accrued interest), an individual qualified under the personal debt restructuring measure 
(“PDRM”) would need to pay only THB 50 prior to the loan’s stated maturity date. 
21
 The title “Personal Debt Restructuring Measure” is the authors’ translation of the official title in 
the Thai Language “Matrakarn Prab Krongsang Nee Pak Prachachoen” as there has not been an official 
English title of the measure at the time this Article was written.  The use of the term “Personal Debt 
Restructuring Measure” is meant to capture a word-for-word translation of the Thai title, as well as 
distinguish it from other similar measures for which the title in Thai has already been officially translated 
into English, such as the “Corporate Debt Restructuring.”  See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 
89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
22
 See Wichit Chantanusornsiri, Credit Card NPLs with State Banks to Get 50% Write-down, 
BANGKOK POST, Oct. 6, 2005.  See also Darana Chudasri & Wichit Chantanusornsiri, Banks Want Clearer 
Details of Latest Aid Scheme, BANGKOK POST, Oct. 11, 2005. 
23
 Conversions from THB to USD are calculated using the relevant annual currency exchange rate of 
THB 40 per USD. 
24
 See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
25
 See Wichit Chantanusornsiri & Darana Chudasri, Banks Worry About Bad-Debt Habit, BANGKOK 
POST, Oct. 5, 2005.  The term “moral hazard” originates from discussion about insurance economics and is 
used in this Article to describe a situation when there is a lack of incentive to guard against risk where one 
is protected from its consequence.  See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 195 
(16th ed. 1998). 
26
 As of March 24, 2006, the Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act (“IDRA”) has been revised and 
incorporated into the wider-reaching coverage area of the Debt Rehabilitation and Debtor Act, which 
covers both individuals as well as corporate entities. 
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criteria, the PDRM risks being yet another “restructuring opportunity” in 
which borrowers would still potentially be in debt at the end of the process. 
This Article’s main research objective is to provide a comparative 
analysis of the regulatory approaches relating to consumer credit policies in 
both post-1997 Thailand and South Korea to determine whether Thailand’s 
“preemptive” method as reflected in the 2004 BOT Regulation or South 
Korea’s “bailout” method as reflected in the IDRA represents a more 
effective approach in terms of mitigating the surging problem of individual 
credit defaults found in both economies.  After providing an introduction to 
the parallel rises in popularity of credit card usage, the noticeable shift in 
consumer spending cultures, and a general description of the spending 
hangovers that followed the 1997-1998 financial crises, this Article will 
proceed as follows.  First, a comparison will be made between the Korean 
and Thai regulators’ efforts to cope with the credit card boom phenomenon, 
with specific focus given to the IDRA and its stated objectives versus the 
2004 BOT Regulation, highlighting the similarities as well as differences in 
the regulatory approaches between the Korean government’s IDRA and the 
Thai Ministry of Finance’s PDRM.  Second, a policy analysis evaluating the 
IDRA’s approach will focus on significant similarities or differences in the 
2004 BOT Regulation and the PDRM in Thailand.  This Article concludes 
that, based on the evidence, Thailand’s “preemptive” approach may prove 
preferable in terms of a legislative solution to the consumer credit card 
epidemic.  This is due to the fact that a “preemptive” approach appears to be 
more effective at alleviating the consumer credit problem, may represent a 
better use of tax revenue, and may provide for a better investment climate as 
a result of its relatively non-interventionist approach.  More broadly, this 
Article also notes some of the relevant regulatory risks associated with both 
the Korean and Thai post-1997 consumer credit policies.  The result of our 
examination of these risks suggests that they could potentially increase the 
likelihood of destabilizing both the Asian and the international financial 
markets due to issues of moral hazard and unnecessary market intervention. 
II. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION VS. FREE MARKET SOLUTIONS: A 
RELEVANT QUESTION FOR SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND 
The issue of whether or how a government may regulate the increased 
availability of loans to borrowers with bad credit histories as a result of a 
specific public policy has always been a primary concern among policy 
6 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 17 NO. 1 
 
makers and academics alike.27  However, as our survey below concludes, 
there has yet to be any academic literature that deals directly with this issue, 
particularly in the context of credit card markets in South Korea and 
Thailand.  Thus far, no literature currently exists that deals with individual 
credit defaulters from a legal and policy perspective within the South Korean 
context in the post-1997 period.  Existing research separates the credit 
defaulter problem from the credit card corporation delinquency problem, and 
generally focuses on credit card corporation delinquency in relation to South 
Korean macroeconomic growth.  For example, Choi (2004) argues that 
stimulating macroeconomic growth by encouraging credit card companies to 
rampantly issue credit cards was not sound economic policy. 28   Choi 
discusses several government policies intended as countermeasures, but does 
not focus on the legal issues embedded in these policies.  Similarly, the 
Korea Institute of Finance analyzed Korean government policy relating to 
credit card defaulters, and argued for the greater use of revolving credit card 
lines (which is common in the United States, but currently not widely 
adopted in South Korea) along with related structural reforms.29  Finally, Oh 
(2004) discusses the IDRA, but only in the context of a practical guide for 
interested credit defaulters who are seeking IDRA protection.30 
As for Thailand, many studies explore the merit of consumer-led 
recovery as one of the necessary strategies for a successful Thai economy 
and address the subsequent rise in consumer debt following the 1997-98 
Crisis.  For example, Chaipravat and Hoontrakul (2000) discuss the 
problems encountered by the Thai credit market after the 1997-98 Crisis, 
and identify the personal consumption and liberalization of retail credit as 
one major policy proposal among others that was responsible for the Thai 
economy’s recovery after 1997.31  However, their paper does not discuss the 
ramifications of policy initiatives fostering a consumer-driven recovery. 
Even fewer studies have sought to explicitly compare Thailand’s 
initiatives with the responses of foreign counterparts facing similar 
                                           
27
 For a recent discussion of this issue as related to the home ownership policy and housing loans, 
see Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, Subprime Mortgage Loans–Posner’s Comment 
(June 24, 2007), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/06/subprime_mortga.html. 
28
 See generally GON PIL CHOI, KOREA INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, SHINYONG BUHLANGJAH 
KEUPJEUNGEUH WONINGWAH DEHCHEK [CAUSE OF CREDIT DEFAULTERS AND ITS COUNTERMEASURES], 
REPORTS ON POLICY RESEARCH, (2004). 
29
 See generally 13 KOREA INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, CONFRONTING STRATEGY FOR THE CREDIT 
DEFAULTER PROBLEM, KOREAN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL OUTLOOK, at 8 (2004). 
30
 See generally SOO-GEUN OH, ET AL., EASY UNDERSTANDING OF THE IDRA PROCESS, (Ewha 
University Press 2004). 
31
 See generally Olarn Chaipravat & Pongsak Hoontrakul, Thai Credit Market Failures: The 1997 
Aftermath, 15 TDRI Q. REV. 4, (Dec. 2000). 
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challenges, such as South Korea.  A recent BOT Discussion Paper by 
Thaicharoen, Ariyapruchya and Chuched (2004) discusses rising household 
debt in Thailand, focuses on the risks and policy implications arising from 
increasing household debt, and compares credit card market developments in 
South Korea and Thailand.32  While the Discussion Paper concludes that the 
Thai regulators have taken a more cautious approach to cope with the 
increasing popularity of credit card usage, the Korea-Thai comparison is 
brief and expressly limited to identifying and suggesting the rise of 
household debt as a macro-economic threat.  It neither evaluates nor 
discusses in detail the 2004 BOT Regulation or related efforts by the BOT to 
cope with mounting credit card debt; its limited comparison of Korean and 
Thai policies is one component of a more general discussion of risks 
stemming from high household debt.  Finally, although the PDRM generated 
much controversy when it was announced by the MOF in October 2005, its 
implementation is recent and there is no current academic literature that 
deals directly with the PDRM as part of a continuing governmental effort to 
bail out consumer loan debtors.  While Thailand’s PDRM expressly excludes 
credit card debtors, this Article suggests that the differences and similarities 
in their theoretical approach and procedural character merit a comparison 
with South Korea’s IDRA. 
This Article attempts to provide greater clarity as to how 
governmental regulations and debt relief efforts may impact the Thai and 
South Korean markets, thereby benefitting not only the academic 
community but also the financial community.33  The Article concludes that 
the “preemptive” approach in the 2004 BOT Regulation is preferable to the 
“bailout” approach taken by South Korea’s IDRA and Thailand’s PDRM for 
three reasons.  First, the total credit card outstanding balance decreased after 
the BOT enacted its regulation.  Second, preemption is lower in cost to 
implement because it does not pass the cost of resolving bad loans to 
taxpayers, as is the case with the bailout approach.  Finally, the credit 
markets are more stable as a result of the preemptive approach because it 
signals to the market that the regulator will make narrowly focused efforts to 
                                           
32
 See generally Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14. 
33
 In particular, global investment banks based in the Asia-Pacific region have a significant interest 
in the South Korean and Thai markets.  Specifically, such interest is in part focused on the Korean 
consumer non-performing loan (“NPL”) market.  If the IDRA is effective in curing South Korea’s creditor 
delinquency problem, the NPL pool size may be less than if the IDRA is ineffective legislation and does 
not significantly curb the growing number of consumer defaults in South Korea.  Often such NPLs are 
purchased by global investment banks, such as Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank, and 
Lehman Brothers, to use as collateral for the issuance of high-yielding asset-backed securities vis-à-vis the 
use of a special purpose vehicle as issuer domiciled in a tax-efficient jurisdiction, such as Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Labuan, or Mauritius. 
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cope with a potential credit crisis, as opposed to implementing broad bailout 
frameworks which can create moral hazard issues. 
III. FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: KOREA AND THAILAND’S DEBT DILEMMA 
A. Non-Performing Loans: The Link Between the 1997 Financial Crisis 
and Consumer-Driven Policy 
The 1997-98 Crisis had profoundly negative effects on both the Thai 
and South Korean economies and triggered somewhat similar responses.  
Facing enormous numbers of non-performing loans (“NPLs”), 34  both 
governments created national asset management companies (“AMCs”)35 to 
purchase NPLs from domestic institutions and sell them to interested 
investors. 
1. Thailand’s Response to Non-Performing Loans: The Financial Sector 
Restructuring Agency, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory 
Committee, and Other Structural Changes 
The decision on July 2, 1997 to float its national currency set in 
motion a series of events triggering Thailand’s 1997-98 Crisis.36  Freed of 
the rigid national controls previously applied to them, exchange rates 
fluctuated causing many business borrowers to default on loans obtained 
while the THB was tied to the USD.  Substantially similar to the experience 
of many Asian nations facing the 1997-98 Crisis, NPLs represented one of 
the most troublesome ramifications of the 1997-98 Crisis for Thailand.  The 
majority of NPLs were commercial loans originated primarily to industrial 
and real estate sectors.37  At the end of May 1999, the level of NPLs in 
Thailand reached THB 2.7 trillion (approximately USD sixty billion) or 
47.7% of total loans made by Thai financial institutions.38 
                                           
34
 Although there has not been a set of universal criteria to distinguish performing from non-
performing loans because loan classification still varies from one country to another, it is broadly 
understood that the term NPL refers to a loan that may not be repaid in full.  In practice, professionals 
called upon to make such a distinction will rely on administrative or accounting conventions prevailing in 
the country involved.  See generally Adriaan M. Bloem & Cornelis N. Gorter, The Treatment of 
Nonperforming Loans in Macroeconomic Statistics (IMF Working Paper, Dec. 2001).  In this Article, the 
authors will use the term in the broad sense, but will also cite the specific classification standard where 
appropriate. 
35
 Being state vehicles, Asset Management Companies are effectively funded by taxpayers. 
36
 See generally, Chaipravat & Hoontrakul, supra note 31. 
37
 See BANK OF THAILAND, CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM THE AFTERMATH OF 
THAI ECONOMIC CRISIS 12 (Tumnong Dasri ed., 1st ed. 2001). 
38
 Id. at 1. 
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In response to the 1997-98 Crisis and in cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund, Thailand created a national agency with the 
goal of disposing assets of failed financial institutions, including NPLs and 
their related security rights, to potential investors.39  The resulting agency, 
the Financial Sector Restructuring Agency (“FRA”), was created in 1997.40 
In addition, many structural and organizational changes were 
introduced in the Thai legal system to handle both the short- and long-term 
impacts of NPLs.  For instance, shortly after the creation of the FRA, a set of 
new regulations was added to the Thai Securities Law to facilitate the FRA 
sale of such assets.  This effectively allowed unprecedented levels of foreign 
ownership of Thai assets through the use of special purpose vehicles 
empowered to purchase and hold FRA assets.41 
Other official efforts to resolve NPLs included measures to facilitate 
voluntary debt restructuring (or “private workout”)42 in the corporate sector 
through the establishment of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory 
Committee (“CDRAC”).  CDRAC was chaired by the Governor of the BOT 
and included representatives from local and foreign financial associations.43  
Another critical change to cope with the NPL epidemic was the amendment 
of key provisions of the Thai Bankruptcy Act.  As a result of such 
                                           
39
 For an excellent summary of the macroeconomic backdrop of the 1997-98 Crisis in Thailand and 
the role of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) in relation thereto, see Lindgren et al., International 
Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons from Asia, at 93, IMF Occasional 
Paper 188 (2000).  For a more detailed analysis of the financial crisis and Thailand, see AMMAR 
SIAMWALLA, ANATOMY OF THE THAI ECONOMIC CRISIS, IN THAILAND BEYOND THE CRISIS (Peter C. Warr 
ed., forthcoming), available at http://www.info.tdri.or.th/reports/subj_ind.htm. 
40
 See Lindgren et al., supra note 39, at 31. 
41
 This is in reference to the Thai Securities and Exchange Commission regulations that pertain to 
the establishment, qualification, and other requirements to maintain a group of funds that aim to attract 
institutional investors to invest in NPLs and related assets of failed Thai financial institutions, namely the 
Property Fund for Resolving Financial Institution Problems and the Mutual Fund for Resolving Financial 
Institution Problems.  These vehicles are commonly known in structured-product circles simply, and 
respectively, as the “Type 2” and the “Type 3” funds.  For the specific text of the regulations, see the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Notifications Kor. Nor. 15/2541 and Kor. Nor. 16/2541, both dated 
May 24, 1998, and their subsequent related regulations (available online in the Thai language at the Thai 
SEC website at http://capital.sec.or.th/webapp/nrs/nrs_search.php?ref_id=99).  For a general description in 
the Thai language of the characteristics and benefits of these funds, as well as other Thai mutual funds, 
refer to the Thai SEC website at http://www.sec.or.th/th/asset/mutual/edu/edu_mf.shtml. 
42
 “Private workout” is a term loosely referring to the out-of-court negotiation process between 
lenders and borrowers to restructure loan terms. 
43
 See BANK OF THAILAND, CORPORATE DEBT RESTRUCTURING: LESSONS FROM THE AFTERMATH OF 
THAI ECONOMIC CRISIS 46-47 (Tumnong Dasri ed., 1st ed. 2001).  For a more detailed discussion in the 
Thai language regarding the function of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee 
(“CDRAC”), see id. at 46-83. 
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amendments, institutional lenders are now allowed to extend loans to debtors 
with recoverable businesses experiencing short-term illiquidity.44 
Finally, to compliment the various efforts to resolve Thai NPLs as 
described above, the Thai Asset Management Corporation (“TAMC”), a 
central debt resolution entity, was established in June 2001.  Much has been 
made of the political aspect of the establishment of the FRA and the 
TAMC,45 as the former was perceived as selling large portions of Thai assets 
to foreign investors while the latter was portrayed as a patriotic savior of 
Thai-owned businesses.  Where the FRA had viewed asset sales as its 
priority, the TAMC was organized to assume a wider range of debt 
resolution efforts that included not only loan asset sales, but also supervision 
of private workouts as well as altering borrowers’ corporate financing 
structure when necessary.46 
What was the role of consumer loans in the 1997-98 Crisis and what 
happened to such loans afterwards?  Compared to other countries that were 
severely affected by the 1997-98 Crisis, consumer or individual loans made 
up a substantially smaller portion relative to business loans in Thailand’s 
total NPL pool. 47   Because of uncertainties during the first few years 
following the 1997-98 Crisis, existing local banks initially reduced lending 
to preserve their capital and liquidity.48  Thus, consumer loans have neither 
played a critical role, nor became a significant NPL concern, during the few 
years following the 1997-98 Crisis.49 
The lending climate changed markedly in 2001, however, when 
several factors began to contribute to the growth in the personal loan market.  
This growth eventually surpassed individuals’ income growth.50  One factor 
contributing to a broader access to capital included increases in market 
                                           
44
 See PRARACHABANYAT LOMLALAI [THAI BANKRUPCTY ACT AND AMENDMENTS] Por. Sor. 2483, 
Por. Sor. 2541, Por. Sor. 2542, Por. Sor. 2543 (referencing the amendments made in 1998, 1999, and 
2000).  The specific reference to the example given is Article 94(2) of Bankruptcy Act, which was 
amended by the Bankruptcy Act (No.5) (B.E. 2542) in 1999 (the “1999 Amendment”).  Prior to the 1999 
Amendment, Article 94(2) provided that an unsecured creditor may not collect from a debtor when a loan 
was extended with the knowledge that the debtor is debt-ridden.  This language prevents lenders from 
extending loans to debt-ridden debtors who may otherwise possess a good degree of recovery potential.  
45
 The Financial Sector Restructuring Agency (“FRA”) was established under the government 
headed by the Democrat Party while the Thai Asset Management Corporation (“TAMC”) was established 
under the government headed by the Thai Rak Thai Party. 
46
 For a discussion of the objectives of the TAMC, see About TAMC, 
http://www.tamc.or.th/page/front_en/know/index.php (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).  Thai political observers 
may find it noteworthy that, while giving a broad background to the crisis, the page does not mention FRA. 
47
 Individual loans made up fifteen percent of the total NPL pool at the time.  See Chaipravat & 
Hoontrakul, supra note 31, at 20. 
48
 Id. at 16. 
49
 For a comparison of levels of consumer loan NPLs between 1999 and 2001, see supra note 37. 
50
 See Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14, at 24. 
JANUARY 2008          CONSUMER CREDIT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA AND THAILAND 11 
 
efficiency, such as more market entrants and the establishment of central 
credit bureaus. 51   Another factor was an increase in lending supply, as 
represented by larger pools of liquid funds from existing banks and the 
proliferation of non-banks offering credit card services.52  Keen observers of 
Thai politics also noted that the turning point in this trend was largely due to 
the arrival of the ruling party Thai Rak Thai,53 whose election campaign 
rhetoric and policy initiatives often promised, essentially, broader access to 
capital for a greater number of consumers.54 
While the NPL problems in Thailand resulting from the 1997-98 
Crisis centered mostly on commercial credit, the subsequent changes in 
lending and in the political landscape that are discussed above have created a 
burgeoning consumer credit market much like that in South Korea. 
2. South Korea’s Response to Non-Performing Loans: Korea Asset 
Management Corporation and the Bad Bank and Harmony Program 
South Korea is widely touted as one of the more successful cases of a 
country resolving its NPL epidemic following the 1997-98 Crisis.  Korea’s 
success was due in large part to the reconstitution of the Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (“KAMCO”) which was established, designated, 
and financed to efficiently resolve South Korea’s NPL problem and to 
manage government-owned assets. 55   Following the 1997-98 Crisis, 
KAMCO purchased and pooled a large number of KRW-denominated NPLs 
from various troubled domestic institutions.  This action helped to create a 
market for NPL buyers in Asia who were looking to purchase such NPLs 
                                           
51
 Id. at 14. 
52
 Id. 
53
 The party’s name translates into English as “Thais Love Thais.” 
54
 There are various interpretations of the “broader access to capital” policy, or rather, group of 
policies announced by the Thai Rak Thai Party.  The two polar-opposite views with respect to these 
policies are 1) that such a policy is carried out with the goal to foster and expand, at a grass-roots level,  
entrepreneurship in Thailand; and 2) that such policy is an attempt to lure the poor electorate to enable a 
few big “Thai family conglomerates” to take over Thai politics.  For an example of the former, see H.E. Dr. 
Somkid Jatusripitak, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Address at the United Nations-
ESCAP, Bangkok: Microfinance Policy and Governance (Mar. 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.mof.go.th/mof_speech/mof_speech_06mar45e.htm.  For an example of the latter, see Pasuk 
Phongpaichit & Chris Baker, Pluto-Populism in Thailand: Business Remaking Politics, in POPULISM AND 
REFORMISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE THREAT AND PROMISE OF NEW POLITICS (Eva-Lotta E. Hedman & 
John T. Sidel, eds., forthcoming), available at http://pioneer.netserv.chula.ac.th/~ppasuk/papers.htm. 
55
 Prior to such reconstitution, Korea Asset Management Corporation (“KAMCO”) was primarily 
used for the purchase and sale of Korean real estate.  See Korea Asset Management Corporation, 
http://www.kamco.co.kr/eng.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2007). 
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denominated in various Asian currencies by investors based in Asia and 
elsewhere, which were notably comprised of foreign financial institutions.56 
The KAMCO has two sources of funds:  a Non-Performing Asset 
(“NPA”) fund and KAMCO’s own assets.  The NPA fund was used primarily 
to buy and sell NPLs from domestic financial institutions following the 
1997-98 Crisis, and ended its mandated period57 in the fourth quarter of 
2003. 58   In this process, KAMCO first examines a debtor’s assets to 
determine whether sufficient income exists to repay owed debt obligations.59 
Since 2003, KAMCO has expanded its service to meet greater needs 
for managing credit delinquency.60  In 2004, KAMCO launched Bad Bank 
and Harmony (“Bad Bank”) as one of the programs implemented in 
accordance with the Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy’s policy to 
help individual credit delinquents.  Two other related and relevant individual 
debtor rehabilitation programs are the Credit Counseling and Recovery 
Service and the Credit Bank, which are run separately and independently 
from each other and from the government.61 
Bad Bank worked as a virtual fund and a system established by a 
consortium of 620 domestic financial institutions and KAMCO.62  KAMCO 
was the actual body which carried out all the administrative duties of the 
Bad Bank program, such as entering into contracts between financial 
institutions and debtors; restructuring and refinancing debts; issuing new 
longer-term, lower-interest loans; and carrying out loan collection and 
recovery services.63  Bad Bank was a temporary program whose first period 
application acceptance ended on November 22, 2004; the program began in 
May of the same year.64 
                                           
56
 For further information on KAMCO’s comprehensive report on managing NPLs, see 2004 Nyun 
Balgan Busil-chaekweon-jungri-gigeum-baekseo, available at www.kamco.or.kr (navigate to Jahroh 
Mahdang Gongeh- jahroh-sil) (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
57
 KAMCO has operated its program to help individual debt relief with KAMCO’s own funds since 
1998.  This program continues to operate. 
58
 Conversation, on a no-name basis, with an officer at Shinyong Jiwon Il-Team [Consumer Loan 
Management Dept. 1], KAMCO, Feb. 21, 2005. 
59
 See Korea Asset Management Corporation, http://www.kamco.co.kr/eng.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2007). 
60
 See supra note 55 (select “Business Areas” tab; then in the left pane select “Support of Consumer 
Credit Recovery”; then select “OnCredit” and “Bad Bank”).  
61
 Telephone interview with Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy officer, Feb. 18, 2005. 
62
 See supra note 55 (select “Business Areas” tab; then in the left pane select “Support of Consumer 
Credit Recovery”; then select “OnCredit” and “Bad Bank”).  
63
 Id. 
64
 CreditBank, http://www.creditbank.co.kr/credit/creditcover.cb?m=badBankProgram (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2007). 
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B. Consumption-Driven Growth: The Road to Recovery from Crises 
The previous section described how both the Thai and South Korean 
governments tried to resolve the NPL epidemic in part through the creation 
of national asset management companies, TAMC and KAMCO respectively.  
This section describes how both governments also tried to spur domestic 
consumption through various “cheap credit” initiatives and legislative 
measures following the 1997-98 Crisis. 
1. Thailand: Lowering the Income Floor for Credit Card Applicants 
As in Korea, Thai consumers were ushered into the credit card era as a 
result of the Thai government’s efforts to stimulate a consumption-led 
recovery from the 1997-98 Crisis.  Prior to the 1997-98 Crisis, Thais were 
relatively similar to Koreans in their generally “prone-to-saving” behavior 
with respect to earned income.65  To induce consumers to borrow and spend, 
the BOT lowered the minimum monthly income requirement for a credit 
card applicant from THB 15,000 (approximately USD 375) to THB 7,500 
(USD 187) in 2002, a move that triggered a sharp increase in the number of 
credit cards issued.66  Although the BOT reversed course later the same year, 
the circulation of credit cards in Thailand nevertheless reached 9.9 million 
by the end of the fourth quarter of 2005, a more than six-fold increase since 
1999.67  Between 1999 and 2004, total outstanding credit card balances more 
than doubled to THB 122.18 billion (about USD three billion).68  To address 
this increase in debt, the BOT issued new regulations in 2004 requiring a 
monthly debt servicing ratio of no less than ten percent of an individual’s 
total outstanding balance and a credit line ceiling of five times an 
individual’s average monthly income.69 
Nevertheless, changes in government regulations figure prominently 
in the increase of the number of less disciplined credit consumers with credit 
cards.  A sharp 76% one-year rise in credit card outstanding balances 
occurred in 2002 when the minimum income requirement for a credit card 
                                           
65
 See Kobsak Pootrakul, Kiatipong Ariyapruchya & Thammanoon Sodsrichai, Long-Term Saving in 
Thailand: Are We Saving Enough and What Are the Risks? (Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper, 2005).  
The study indicates a decline in household saving trends.  The authors find that this decline is substantially 
attributable to the decline in the average propensity to save, as opposed to the decline in the household 
share of national income.  To generalize, this seems to suggest that Thai consumers save less than before 
not because they earn less but because they just have a behavioral tendency to save less. 
66
 See BANK OF THAILAND, PAYMENT SYSTEMS REPORT 24-25 (June 2003). 
67
 Bank of Thailand, supra note 15. 
68
 See Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14, at 21. 
69
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, §§ 4.5, 4.7. 
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was reduced from THB 15,000 to THB 7500.70  Additionally, a recent survey 
conducted by the National Economic and Social Development Board, a Thai 
government think tank agency, concluded that cardholders with a monthly 
income below THB 10,000 typically carried a monthly balance on their 
cards.71   Finally, almost every occupational group surveyed by the Thai 
National Statistical Office from 2002-2004 reported higher debt to income 
ratios.72 
Although data from a recent BOT study suggests that the number of 
NPLs resulting from credit card loans still remains low, the study cautiously 
noted that such NPLs may become more conspicuous over time.73  In fact, 
present factors may not figure fully into the household debt picture until as 
long as three years after their initial origination.74 
2. South Korea: From Lack of Consumer Spending to Overspending 
One of South Korea’s main problems in 1997-98 was a lack of 
consumer spending to revive its domestic economy.75  To boost consumer 
spending, South Korea began a series of disparate government initiatives to 
promote the mass issuance of credit cards to individuals from 1999 
onwards.76  The solution of offering credit cards to boost consumer spending, 
however, brought the unforeseen problem of a consumer credit binge 
hangover.  Korea’s current economic dilemma comes not from the failure of 
its earlier plans, but from their overabundant success. 
The past decade has been full of signs indicating the emerging trend 
of excessive credit card spending.  For example, in late 2002, over the 
course of the three short years since the government’s 1999 credit card 
                                           
70
 See Bank of Thailand, supra note 15.  The outstanding balances are THB 41 billion at the end of 
the fourth quarter of 2001 and THB 72 billion at end of the fourth quarter of 2002. 
71
 See Chatrudee Theparat, NESDB Concerned About Debt, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 21, 2005. 
72
 See Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14, at 24. 
73
 NPLs may become more conspicuous over time due to factors such as delay in reporting by banks.  
See id. at 26. 
74
 Id. at 26. 
75
 See Asia Development Outlook website, http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2003/kor.asp 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
76
 For a paper focusing more on firm-level credit problems, see Eduardo Borensztein & Jung-Wha 
Lee, International Monetary Fund, Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: Evidence from Firm 
Level Data, at 5, 9, IMF Working Paper No. 00/25 (Jan. 2000).  The paper argues that following the 1997-
98 Crisis, credit was reallocated away from large Korean conglomerates (chaebol) to more “efficient” 
firms.  Id.  For a more political-economic perspective on the Korean 1997-98 Crisis, see generally STEPHAN 
HAGGARD & JONGRYN MO, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 197-218 
(Routledge Press 2000).  In their text, the authors argue that the 1997-98 Crisis was caused by, first, a 
greater liberalization between state and business, and second, a timing conundrum in which the crisis 
occurred at an election year, which may have added both to its depth and severity.  Id. 
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initiative, Koreans went from having very few or no credit cards to having 
an average of nearly four credit cards per person.77  New lines of credit 
quickly translated into increased consumer spending and increased gross 
domestic product (“GDP”).  In 1999, South Korean GDP grew by an 
extremely robust 10.9%, followed by 9.3% in 2000.78  Although such growth 
was obviously not entirely attributable to Korea’s 1999 credit card initiatives, 
a certain portion of such growth can be attributed to such policies. 
It is also important to note that there are many differences between the 
Korean and Thai credit card markets today, particularly from the regulatory 
perspective.79  Unlike its Korean counterpart, the Thai government has yet to 
provide its consumers such use incentives as Korea’s credit card tax 
deduction.  Once Thai applicants are approved for credit cards, not only will 
extra benefits not be provided,80 but new cardholders will be subject to a 
stricter 2004 BOT Regulation. 
C. The Rise of Credit Card Debt Resulted from Consumption-Driven 
Policy Initiatives 
Following the 1997-98 Crisis, the government cheap credit initiatives 
led to a dramatic credit card spending hangover in both South Korea and 
Thailand.  In South Korea, domestic consumers began to spend at such high 
levels that credit card usage went far beyond many individuals’ repayment 
capacity.81  By late 2003, South Korea’s economy was weighed down with 
                                           
77
 Larkin, supra note 2; see also Asia Development Outlook website, 
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2003/kor.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
78
 Jahyeong Koo & Sherry L. Kiser, U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Recovery from a 
Financial Crisis: The Case of South Korea, ECON. & FIN. REV. 25 (2001). 
79
 Although the Thai government does indeed support retail borrowing through the use of credit 
cards, the difference may lie in what happens after a Thai resident is accepted for a credit card. 
80
 A good example of how different the card-friendly policy could be in the Korea-Thai comparison 
is this ironic regulatory twist:  while Koreans may have tax incentive to increase their use of credit cards, if 
a Thai cardholder chooses to pay his tax through a credit card to the Thai Revenue Department (or other 
fee-charging public offices), such holder will incur additional cost from doing so.  This is as a result of the 
Bank of Thailand Circulars ThorPorTor. ForNorSor. (21) Wor. 768/2549 and ThorPorTor and ForNorSor. 
(21) Wor. 769/2549, Re: Fees for Payment of Taxes and Duties to the Revenue Department by Credit 
Cards, both dated June 14, 2006, which allow the bank and non-bank credit card operators to pass on to the 
holder the service fee normally charged to commercial retailers when credit cards were used as a payment 
method. 
81
 As background, South Korean households went from being largely debt free in 1997-98 to holding 
an average of USD 27,000 in debt per household in less than six years.  Almost four million Koreans have 
defaulted on credit-card debt and household loans, a figure representing close to ten percent of the country's 
population.  The result has been more than USD 375 billion in household debt.  One example of the dire 
effects relating to the credit card crisis is LG Card (South Korea’s second largest credit card company at the 
time), which collapsed in 2003, creating great concern in Korea about rising consumer debt and the fear of 
massive defaults.  LG Card had started to rationalize its operations by disposing of some of its investments, 
including a two percent stake in LG Investments, estimated to be worth about USD 149 million.  The 
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approximately USD 100 billion in credit card debt (not including personal 
loan debt obligations).82   Further, by December 2003 approximately 3.7 
million South Korean consumers were delinquent on debt payments by three 
months or more.83 
Focusing on consumer loans, Thai borrowers were substantially less 
leveraged than their Korean counterparts as Thailand’s household debt to 
GDP ratio fell to thirty-three percent in 2003, compared to Korea’s ratio of 
nearly seventy-five percent. 84   Individual credit card balances only 
accounted for less than three percent of the total Thai household debt 
outstanding balances in 2003.85  To complete the Thai debt cycle picture, 
NPLs resulting from credit card debt remained below five percent of total 
outstanding household loans from 2001 to the first quarter of 2004.86 
One may need to consider other additional factors before comparing 
borrowing behavior in the two countries.  The most notable factors are the 
more advanced stage of the “credit card ready” Korean retail culture and the 
network of “informal” channels of access to loans available to Thais for 
personal consumption purposes. 87   These factors may suggest that Thai 
borrowers are not less susceptible than their Korean counterparts to 
borrowing heavily for personal consumption purposes because credit cards 
are not as readily accepted in Thailand as in South Korea. 
                                                                                                                              
struggling LG Card Co. received a vote of confidence after U.S. broker Merrill Lynch announced on 
August 5, 2004 that it would buy USD 400 million of asset-backed bonds issued by LG Card.  See Larkin, 
supra note 2. 
From the authors’ perspective, the South Korean government encouraged the growth of credit cards to 
boost consumer spending shortly after the 1997-98 Crisis but paid a heavy price in defaults.  Credit card 
companies and banks extended credit with little concern for repayment risk in the knowledge that the 
government wanted to increase debt spending, with the strong implication that credit was tacitly 
underwritten by the national treasury.  Further, in 2003, new legislation was passed mandating that credit 
card firms curb their credit allocations, insist on credit checks, and temper cash loans.  The regulation is 
known as the Regulation on Supervision of Credit-Specialized Financial Business (of which Chapter V 
relates to consumer protection and preservation of credit order). 
82
 Larkin, supra note 2. 
83
 See World Bank website, http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/Korea+April+ 
2004/$File/Korea+April04.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
84
 See Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14, at 26.  The Thaicharoen paper however cites the data from 
the second quarter of 2003, which for South Korea the household debt as part of GDP is quoted at 62%.  Id. 
85
 Id. at 56. 
86
 Id. at 25. 
87
 Id. at 18-19.  According to a survey conducted by the National Statistical Office (during the first 
quarter of 2004), fifteen percent of total households borrow from informal creditors, and more than fifteen 
percent of these informal debtors pay monthly interest of five to twenty percent (or 60-240% annually).  Id. 
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D. The Cultural Shift that Existed from Traditional Credit Constraints 
Toward Materialism 
The clash of cultures that existed within both modern South Korea 
and Thailand parallels traditional Confucian and Buddhist tenets.  
Specifically, the idea of minimizing present consumption was put on a direct 
collision course with the consumer credit policies enacted after the 1997-98 
Crisis.  Such policies allowed many individuals to spend now and pay later 
for various material goods, which fueled credit card spending in both 
economies. 
1. The Clash Between South Korea’s Confucianism and Consumerism 
South Korea’s credit card epidemic was, in large part, unforeseeable 
in a conservative nation still largely based on traditional Confucian values.88  
In part due to such ideals, the Korean government seemingly presumed that 
the potential of public dishonor brought by bankruptcy would act as a brake 
on consumer spending.89  At the same time, until a proposed credit rating 
scheme was established in 2006,90 no credit rating system existed in South 
Korea to assess the credit risk of individual borrowers, such as the systems 
in many other developed economies.  This further aggravated the nation’s 
credit card spending hangover. 
Despite traditional cultural norms, the sudden availability of 
unsecured credit lines, which could be spent at any time, proved very 
popular.91  Additionally, because of the combination of the 1999 initiative, 
absence of detailed personal credit history information, and rigid privacy 
laws, credit cards could be obtained by many Koreans with minimal or no 
credit checks.  Thus began the credit card spending binge that rapidly 
transformed into South Korea’s current and ongoing credit card hangover.  
                                           
88
 See LAURA C. NELSON, MEASURED EXCESS: STATUS, GENDER, AND CONSUMER NATIONALISM IN 
SOUTH KOREA 107 (Columbia University Press 2000). 
89
 However, countering such traditional ideals that stemmed in large part from the Korean Chosun 
period (1392-1910) were post-1997-98 modern Korean society individual demands and materialistic needs.  
Specifically, many Koreans, including many younger Koreans, saw credit cards as a relatively easy way to 
obtain formerly unobtainable high-priced luxury goods. 
90
 Na Jeong-ju, New Credit Rating System to Affect 28 Million, KOREA TIMES, 2006, available at 
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=credit+rating++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/biz/
200612/kt2006121018044011910.htm&media=kt.  The new credit rating system was conceived by the 
Korea Credit Bureau (“KCB”), which provides for a so-called “KCB Score Model” to calculate credit 
scores for individuals that is projected to affect 28 million people.  According to one KCB official quoted 
in the article, “So far, banks have had different credit standards for individuals.”  Id. 
91
 Id. 
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Table 1 below details the spike in credit card delinquency levels following 
the government’s 1999 initiatives.92 
 
Table 1.  Delinquency Rates by Credit Card Provider.93 
 
Credit Card Provider Percentage in 2002 
Percentage 
in 2003 
BC 7.53 8.78 
LG 5.86 17.9 
Samsung 4.91 10.59 
Foreign Exchange 6.64 12.19 
Hyundai 13.09 8.05 
Lotte 20.08 3.47 
Woori 6.32 22.31 
Shinhan 5.25 6.14 
Total 5.96 14.05 
2. Thailand’s Internal Clash Between Buddhism and Materialism  
Similar to the tension between Confucianism and consumerism in 
Korea, there is a collision of trends in Thailand between traditional 
consumption culture rooted in Buddhism, which deemphasizes the 
accumulation of one’s worldly possessions,94 and the newer post-1945 trend 
that views accumulated wealth as the manifestation of one’s achievement.95  
                                           
92
 See also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2005 22, Fig. 2.3 (2005), 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2005/kor.asp (last visited Dec. 17, 2007) (graphically 
comparing household income to debt burden in Korea from 1995 to 2003). 
93
 Financial Supervisory Service, http://www.fss.or.kr/kor/nws/nbd/bodobbs_v.jsp?seqno=8591& 
no=24&gubun=01&menu=nws010200 (select “Credit Card Company Records”; data can be found on page 
six of the downloaded file) (last visited Dec. 17, 2007). 
94
 It is difficult to pinpoint the specific source of this concept that is specifically applicable to the 
traditional Thais.  See BUDDHADASA BHIKKHU, HANDBOOK FOR MANKIND (Ariyananda Bhikkhu & 
Roderick Bucknell, trans., Dhammadana Found. 1996), available at 
http://www.buddhanet.net/budasa2.htm.  This is a seminal work from one of the most revered teachers of 
Buddhism in Thailand, which contains a logical articulation of the concept: “Why then are we taught to 
regard things as not worth getting or being?  The answer is this: the concepts of getting and being are 
purely relative; they are worldly ideas based on ignorance.  Speaking in terms of pure reality, or absolute 
truth, we cannot get or be anything at all.  And why?  Simply because both the person who is to do the 
getting and the thing that is to be got are impermanent, unsatisfactory (suffering) and nobody's property.”  
Id. 
95
 There is a famous saying in Thailand and its continuing popularity seems to earn it the status of 
undisputed truth:  “Ngan Kue Nguen, Nguen Kue Ngan; Bandarn Suk” (literally, “work is money, money is 
work, [both shall] bestow happiness [upon a person]).”  While the saying is hardly an explicit 
pronouncement of Thai materialism, its logic seems to suggest an undeniably attractive and consoling link 
between money and happiness, as separated from any intrinsic values of working hard. 
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The data from the same BOT study, which singles out professional 
employees as a group that has the highest amount of household debt 
compared to other occupations,96 may point to the stronger influence of the 
latter materialist trend by suggesting that easy money translates to visible 
achievement, especially at the workplace where employees spend a majority 
of their time.97 
Would the next NPL explosion in Thailand be shepherded by credit 
card consumers?  Being a society that values achievement through ability to 
exhibit wealth, the current credit market seems to suggest that overspending 
is not only tempting, but may also be inevitable.  The survey conducted by 
the National Economic and Social Development Board seemingly supports 
this notion by showing that a group of credit card applicants earning less 
than USD 200 a month will accumulate large debt levels, as well as other 
material possessions which they were once taught to refrain from 
accumulating.98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
96
 See Thaicharoen et al., supra note 14, at 24. 
97
 This also, arguably, is the area where notable pressure exists to exhibit material achievement 
within both Thai and Korean society and culture. 
98
 Alternatively, is this notion simply a pessimistic view not supported by current data?  Up to this 
point, this Article has illustrated that Thailand and Korea have shared similar traits with respect to the 
financial crisis-ridden economic landscape, governmental measures in addressing the crisis in cooperation 
with the IMF, and certain credit constraints and consumption culture.  Several data sets, however, seem to 
indicate that Thai consumers are not headed in the same direction as their Korean counterparts.  First, the 
BOT NPL data shows NPLs categorized in terms of personal consumption loans as a percentage of total 
NPLs in 2005 at its lowest level in five years.  A study by Visa International, who at the time claimed more 
than 80% market share of the Thai credit card market, demonstrated that the Thai delinquency rate has 
moved in the opposite direction to that of Korea.  The delinquency rate has declined sharply after the 1997-
98 Crisis, peaking at 37% in the fourth quarter of 1998 but continuing a downward move to 4% in the 
fourth quarter of 2003.  VISA, THE CREDIT CARD REPORT: CREDIT CARD USE AND DEBT IN THAILAND, May 
2004, http://www.visa-asia.com/ap/center/valueofvisa/industrywatch/includes/uploads/Thailand_Credit_ 
Card_Report.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).  Finally, as shown in Table 2 below, the growth of 
outstanding credit card balances in Thailand exhibits a peak in 2002 that ends in 2005 with a five-year low 
growth rate.  See generally Bank of Thailand, NPLs Outstanding, Loans to Related Parties, Fine and 
Summary Statement of Liabilities and Assets, http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/databank/Financial_ 
Institutions/Npl_Fi/Npl_Fi_E.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
In addition, BOT data also shows the worrisome trend that personal consumption NPL levels have 
also increased since the 1997-98 Crisis, with a peak in November 2003 representing more than 20% of total 
NPLs.  Id. 
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Table 2.  Credit Card Outstanding Balances in Thailand.99 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Outstanding Balance 
(billion THB) 33.6 32.5 41.0 72.5 94.3 118.4 143.4 
Year-on-Year 
Percentage Increase  -3.1 26 77 30 25 21 
IV. THE PROPOSED HANGOVER SOLUTION: BAILOUT VS. PREEMPTION 
In light of the economic and cultural landscape of the credit card 
markets in Thailand and South Korea after the 1997-98 Crisis, this section 
will discuss how the two governments are dealing with the aftermath of the 
consumption-driven initiatives that resulted in the upsurge of credit card 
debt in both countries.  Specifically, this section describes South Korea’s 
IDRA, which the authors consider representative of the approach to 
“bailout” borrowers.  The section will then discuss Thailand’s 2004 BOT 
Regulation, which the authors consider representative of the approach to 
“preempt” potentially bad borrowers from entering the market.  Thailand 
also launched the PDRM, a debt relief measure essentially meant to bailout 
borrowers but not applying to credit card borrowers.  We will also discuss 
this measure in comparison with South Korea’s IDRA in order to highlight 
their similarities and differences. 
A. Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act: South Korea’s Bailout Attempt 
of Debtor Delinquents 
The South Korean government’s proposed solution to its new 
consumer excess spending problem came in the form of the IDRA.  The 
IDRA effectively provided a rehabilitation program for individual debtors at 
the risk of individual bankruptcy, for those debtors who could demonstrate 
consistent income earning capacity.100 
Eligibility for IDRA is limited to those who will receive a set amount 
of salary.101  Coverage for individual debtors is limited to KRW 500 million 
(approximately USD 500,000) for unsecured debt102 and KRW one billion 
                                           
99
 See Bank of Thailand, supra note 15.  The outstanding balance amounts are taken from the fourth 
quarter of each specified year.  The year-on-year increases are the author’s calculation. 
100
 For a non-comparative overview of IDRA focusing on Korea only, see Jasper Kim, Resolving 
South Korea's Credit Card Hangover: An Analysis of the Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act, 31 N.C. J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 431 (Dec. 2005). 
101
 See Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act, art. 1 [hereinafter IDRA]. 
102
 “Unsecured debt” refers to a debt obligation that is not collateralized.  See id. art. 48. 
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(approximately USD 1,000,000) for guaranteed debt. 103   The IDRA 
effectively rescues certain individual debtors, 104  while at the same time 
protecting certain creditor interests. 105   Prior to the IDRA, Korean 
bankruptcy law forgave debtors completely but at the cost of future 
exclusion from the consumer credit market.106  Under the IDRA, affected 
parties such as creditors may lodge an immediate appeal within fourteen 
days following the court’s sentence107 and may appeal108 thereafter in the 
event that the debtor applicant is dissatisfied with the court’s decision.109 
In terms of procedural issues, the IDRA process begins when the 
debtor applies for IDRA consideration and certain required IDRA-related 
documents are submitted to the relevant local court.110  The debtor in need of 
IDRA protection must apply directly to the court that has jurisdiction over 
the debtor’s residence.111  If the debtor has no official residence, the location 
of the debtor’s property determines local court jurisdiction.112 
The IDRA applicant should submit the application in writing, 
detailing relevant information, such as the debtor’s name and Korean 
identification number, the reason and purpose for applying, and the property 
and credits of the debtor.113  Also, the applicant should attach 1) a list of 
creditors with their name, address, and the amount and reason of the credit; 
2) a list of properties owned; 3) a list of the debtor’s income and spending; 
4) related documents, in the event that the applicant has previously applied 
                                           
103
 “Guaranteed debt” refers to debt obligations that have a guarantor feature such that in the event 
that any payment obligation is not made as scheduled the guarantor may be liable to “step into the shoes” of 
the debtor and make one or more outstanding payments.  See id. 
104
 See id. art. 2 (explaining the sources of the “incomes” of the candidates). 
105
 See generally id. art. 1. 
106
 Under Korean bankruptcy law existing during this period relating to individual bankruptcy (gyein 
pahsahn pahsahn, 개인파산; sohbeijahpahsahn, n, 개인파산 소비자파산), when an individual consumer 
fails to repay owed debts, the court, as a compulsory measure, liquidates all of the debtor’s properties 
towards creditor repayment.  One distinguishable difference between IDRA and Korean bankruptcy law at 
that time can be seen within the sections relating to the granting of immunity.  For example, under the 
current Korean bankruptcy law, all debtor-owned property is disposed of by the court before the debtor 
receives immunity vis-à-vis a court decree.  Yet, under IDRA, the debtor does not need to dispose of all 
properties to receive such immunity from the court.  Moreover, evidence in the form of official records 
reflecting the debtor’s default will exist until such immunity is granted, while the debtor under the IDRA 
rehabilitation process does not have such disadvantages.  Recently, the Korean legislature was in the 
process of consolidating its bankruptcy, whereby both individual and institutional parties may be covered. 
107
 See IDRA art. 11. 
108
 In this case there is a supervision committee established pursuant to HYOESA JEONGRI BUHP 
[CORPORATE REARRANGEMENT ACT] art. 93(2) (Kor.).  This committee can evaluate the process of the Act 
during the trial process.  See IDRA art. 13(1). 
109
 See IDRA art. 12. 
110
 See id. art. 49. 
111
 See id. art. 3(1). 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. art. 49. 
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for individual bankruptcy (under the existing Korean bankruptcy law) or 
IDRA relief; 5) data that attests to the fact that the debtor is an employer or a 
business owner; and 6) other documents which the Supreme Court deems 
necessary and relevant to the process.114  Also, the applicant should pay the 
process expenses in advance, the amount115  of which is decided by the 
Supreme Court.  Once the debtor submits the application, the court considers 
whether the candidate is qualified pursuant to IDRA.116  Within fourteen 
days after the debtor’s IDRA application is submitted, the debtor submits a 
proposed repayment plan to the court.117  Thereafter, the court has until one 
month from the initial application date to determine whether to accept or 
reject the IDRA application.118  In the event that the application is accepted, 
any party that has a related interest to the specific proceeding can file an 
application stating such related interest119 within fourteen days following 
public notice of the court’s ruling.120 
Even if the debtor complies with the court-approved schedule and 
fully discharges all of his or her debts within eight years, the debtor is still 
liable for certain charges.121  Such charges may include relevant surplus 
charges, penalty fees, damages due to unlawful conduct, and duties to 
employees such as unpaid salary or retirement pay.122  In the event of debtor 
bad faith through fraud in reporting the total amount of the debtor’s property 
or any actions that cause damage to the lender, the entire IDRA restructuring 
process may become void, and the debtor may face either a maximum of 
five years imprisonment (i.e., criminal prosecution) or USD 50,000 in fines 
(i.e., civil prosecution).123 
                                           
114
 Id. art. 49. 
115
 Id. art. 50. 
116
 IDRA Article 1 states: “The IDRA is designed to effectively rescue those who are suffering by 
financial bankruptcy, yet they have potential to continuously and repeatedly earn incomes in the future.”  
Id. Art. 1. 
117
 See id. art. 70. 
118
 Id. art. 55. 
119
 Id. art. 11. 
120
 If the application is accepted, pursuant to Article 13, the court can organize a supervision 
committee which effectively supervises the entire IDRA-related process with the local court.  See IDRA art. 
13.  Thereafter, pursuant to Article 62, the rescue committee (which focuses on IDRA’s content, such as 
overseeing the debtor’s repayment plan schedule) investigates the debtor’s properties and income.  See 
IDRA art. 62.  Pursuant to Article 24, clause 1, the designated local court then determines the debtor’s asset 
amounts, such as the properties owned by the debtor (referred to as “Individual Rescue Property”), and 
determines the amount of credits the debtor holds (referred to as “Individual Rescue Credits” and 
“Individual Rescue Institutional Credits”).  See IDRA art. 24(1).  The court then examines the debtor’s 
“repayment plan.” 
121
 See IDRA art. 84. 
122
 Id. arts. 84, 87. 
123
 Id. art. 87. 
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Being subject to the IDRA process means that the debtor (the 
applicant for the IDRA process) should repay a specified amount of his or 
her debt obligations.124  Currently, however, the IDRA legislation is silent as 
to what the minimum level of debtor repayment should be.  Presumably this 
issue is under the local court’s discretion.125  Therefore, it is necessary for 
the local court to clarify what properties and income should be used for 
repayment and what should not be used for such repayment. 126   IDRA 
provisions provide that most income and properties except for six months of 
living expenses (including housing expenses) are available for such 
repayment.127 
The definition of “property” used by the court to calculate a debt 
repayment plan under IDRA includes 1) all properties owned by the debtor 
before the start of the individual rescue process, 128 and 2) all properties 
acquired by the debtor 129  during the individual rescue process. 130   The 
rationale for this formulation is that more property means more assets that 
are capable of being liquidated to repay debt obligations.131 
Properties that are not included under “Individual Rescue Property” 
are 1) properties132  that cannot be seized,133  2) housing expenses of the 
debtor and the people supported by the debtor, and 3) six months living 
expenses for the debtor and relevant persons financially supported by the 
debtor. 
Pursuant to IDRA Provision Eight, creditors can participate in the 
court’s determination of what amounts should be repaid to them under the 
IDRA process.134  The IDRA language refers to this process, which can be 
initiated by request from any relevant creditor, as the “Trial for Settling 
                                           
124
 See id. art. 50.  
125
 The amount of the repaid debt is designated in the debtor’s “repayment plan.”  The court examines 
the debtor’s repayment plan including, but not limited to, the debtor’s income, properties, and owed debt 
obligations, in determining the amount of repayment the debtor should make pursuant to IDRA. 
126
 See IDRA art. 74. 
127
 See id. art. 25. 
128
 See id. art. 24(1). 
129
 Id. art. 24(2). 
130
 In the authors’ view, the relevance of defining “property” is that the local court will factor in the 
debtor’s asset amounts to determine whether the debtor-applicant has the ability to repay owed debt 
obligations.  The assumption is that the more assets and property owned, the greater the likelihood that the 
local court may grant IDRA protection. 
131
 The debtor, under IDRA Article 24, also has the right “to manage or dispose of his/her property.”  
However, the properties that are included as part of the debtor-submitted “repayment plan” must be 
managed or disposed of per such debtor’s repayment plan.  See IDRA art. 24. 
132
 IDRA is silent as to exactly what such properties may be. 
133
 See IDRA art. 25(1).  For a description of property exempt from IDRA , see IDRA art. 25(2). 
134
 See IDRA arts. 63-65. 
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Individual Rescue Credit.” 135   Specifically, creditors who have any 
objection136 about the debtor-supplied list of creditors and debts may request 
a hearing during the objection period.137  In this case, the plaintiff is the 
creditor, and the defendant is the debtor.138  The local court has discretion139 
to hold or deny such a hearing.140 
Provision Nine of the IDRA discusses specifics related to the debtor 
repayment plan.141  Under this process, the debtor should submit his or her 
repayment plan within fourteen days following the submitted application for 
the IDRA process. 142   The repayment plan should contain 1) details of 
properties and incomes that can be used for repayment, 2) repayment details 
of the debtor’s individual rescue institutional credits and other credits, and 3) 
repayment details of all or part of the debtor’s individual rescue credits.143 
The court may approve the repayment plan when 1) the repayment 
plan is suitable144 to the provisions of the law, 2) the repayment plan is fair 
and viable, 3) certain IDRA-related administrative fees and expenses are 
paid prior to the approval of the debtor’s repayment plan, and 4) the whole 
amount of the individual rescue credit estimated until the day of the approval 
of the court is not less than the amount of debt that the debtor has to pay 
when seeking bankruptcy protection.145  In terms of debt repayment creditor 
priority, the IDRA Rescue Committee is first in line for any payments made 
by the debtor, which will then be followed by payments 146  to relevant 
creditors.147 
While Provision Nine states what is necessary to grant IDRA debtor 
protection, Provision Ten lists grounds for rejection of an IDRA 
                                           
135
 Such trial-related expenses are typically paid for by the affected creditors.  Id. 
136
 Creditors have from two weeks to two months after the court’s decision to accept the applicant’s 
repayment plan.  Id. 
137
 See id. art. 65. 
138
 Id.  art. 64. 
139
 IDRA is silent as to the exact timeframe and criteria for such process. 
140
 “Individual Rescue Credits” will be determined based on whether 1) creditors (listed on the 
creditor list) did not request for a “Trial for Settling Individual Rescue Credit” during the relevant period, 
or 2) the creditor’s request for a “Trial for Settling Individual Rescue Credit” has been rejected by the 
court.  After the amount of the individual rescue credit is determined, the IDRA process may begin. 
141
 See IDRA art. 71. 
142
 See id. 
143
 Id. 
144
 IDRA is currently silent as to how the term “suitable” can be interpreted. 
145
 However, in this case, the amount of the individual rescue credit can be less than the owed debt 
amount following the bankruptcy filing, provided that all relevant creditors agree.  See IDRA art. 74 (1). 
146
 In this process, the debtor makes payments to the IDRA-appointed rescue committee (which 
oversees the entire payout process).  Thereafter, the rescue committee makes repayments to the debtor’s 
creditors per the IDRA court-approved repayment plan. 
147
 However, this rule does not apply when no rescue committee exists, or when the repayment plan 
or the approval of the repayment plan is structured such that the rule does not apply.  See IDRA art. 76. 
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application.148  Courts can terminate the IDRA process both before and after 
the repayment plan is approved. 149   The court may reject applications 
outright when the debtor provides an unsatisfactory plan, a false basis for 
relief, or fails to attend an IDRA-related judicial hearing.150  Even after the 
court’s approval of the debtor’s repayment plan, it is possible for the plan to 
be abolished or amended either by the official authority of the court or by 
the request of relevant creditors.151  This may happen when 1) it is evident 
that the debtor is not able to repay the debts that are provided pursuant to the 
repayment plan, or 2) the debtor fails to repay owed debts per the court-
approved IDRA repayment plan as a direct result of the debtor’s illegal 
conduct,152 such as concealing his or her property or income.153 
B. Thailand: The Preemptive Approach Taken by the Bank of Thailand 
and the Bailout Approach Taken by the Thai Ministry of Finance 
The 2004 BOT Regulations played a significant role in slowing the 
growth of credit card balances in Thailand.154  Although Thailand’s PDRM is 
similar to South Korea’s IDRA in that both represent governmental efforts to 
bail out consumer loan defaulters, the PDRM expressly excludes credit card 
debts.155  We therefore conclude that Thailand’s dominant regulatory method 
for coping with increasing credit card debt defaults is the preemptive method 
as opposed to the bailout method introduced by IDRA. 
                                           
148
 See generally id. arts. 70, 72, 73, 79, 80, 82, 85, 86. 
149
 See id. art. 75(3). 
150
 See id. art. 79. 
151
 See id. art. 79(2). 
152
 Id. art. 80. 
153
 Moreover, the court should give immunity to the debtor by the official authority of the court or by 
the request of the debtor when the debtor completes the repayment plan.  See id. arts. 83-86.  However, the 
court can give immunity to the debtor, even though such debtor failed to complete the repayment, when 1) 
the debtor was unable to complete the repayment for reasons which the debtor could not control; 2) the 
entire amount of the individual rescue credit estimated (up to the court approval date) is not less than the 
amount of debt that the debtor has to pay when the debtor declares bankruptcy; or 3) the amendment of the 
repayment plan is “impossible.”  Id.  However, the court cannot grant immunity to the debtor when 1) 
material individual rescue credits were omitted from the credit list in bad faith by the debtor-applicant, or 
2) the debtor-applicant failed to observe the responsibilities and duties under IDRA Article 83 (i.e., to repay 
owed debt obligations per the agreed IDRA repayment schedule).  See id. art. 83. 
Further, in terms of penalties pursuant to IDRA Articles 87, 88, and 90, the local court has the ability 
to impose penalties when 1) the debtor attempted to conceal the debtor’s property or decrease the burden of 
repayment for the purpose of harming related creditors (i.e., acts of fraud or willful misrepresentation); 2) 
the rescue committee or the supervisory committee engages in acts of bribery; or 3) the debtor’s property 
investigation takes place for purposes other than those expressly mandated pursuant to IDRA (i.e., the 
debtor’s property is investigated in bad faith outside the purview of IDRA).  See id. arts. 87-90. 
154
 This refers to the Bank of Thailand’s statutory power as the sole regulator of credit card issuers in 
Thailand.  See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 2. 
155
 See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 § 1.1 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
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Despite its inapplicability to credit card borrowers, the authors believe 
that it is important to discuss the PDRM briefly as well as compare it with 
the IDRA because, as mentioned earlier, the PDRM could be viewed 
narrowly as a bailout law.156  With the narrow focus of our study on credit 
card debts, and particularly in light of the contrasting trend in delinquency 
rates between the two countries, we choose to explore first, and in more 
detail, the 2004 BOT Regulation.157 
1. The 2004 Bank of Thailand Regulation: The Bank of Thailand’s 
Preemptive Strike 
The 2004 BOT Regulation is the latest, and strongest, in a series of 
efforts from the BOT to regulate the commercial banks and non-bank credit 
card companies operating in Thailand.158  After witnessing the sharp rise in 
total credit card outstanding balances in 2002, the BOT set a deliberate goal 
to preempt any further rapid buildup in credit card debts.159  This goal is 
explicitly stated in the 2004 BOT Regulation, which aims to “set up a 
precaution and prevent problems that may arise from credit cards in the 
future.”160 
The 2004 BOT Regulation is organized in five parts, which are  
designed to regulate the following areas:  1) the definition of credit card and 
qualifications of the cardholder; 2) the minimum monthly payment 
requirement and conditions for mandatory cancellation of the account; 3) the 
change of credit card debt category to other categories of debt; 4) the use of 
information of cardholders, both for credit line underwriting purposes and 
for the general purpose of keeping information confidential; and 5) the 
                                           
156
 The scope of applicability to individual debtors of the PDRM is similar to that of the IDRA.  See 
id. § 1.3. 
157
 Regarding the contrasting delinquency rates, see supra note 97.  See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra 
note 17. 
158
 For a brief summary of regulatory developments that compares key requirements of the previous 
Bank of Thailand credit card regulations with those of the 2004 Cardholder Requirements, see Thitima 
Chucherd, The Effect of Household Debt on Consumption in Thailand, Bank of Thailand Discussion Paper, 
Apr. 2006, at 10. 
159
 See Dr. Tarisa Watanagase, Deputy Governor, Bank of Thailand, Presentation Given at the Cards 
& Payments: Asia Pacific 2005 Conference & Expo in Bangkok, Thailand: The Future of Card and 
Payments: A Regulator’s Perspective (Sept. 20-21, 2005), available at http://www.bot.or.th/bothome 
page/General/PressReleasesAndSpeeches/Speeches/english_version/speech_Governor&deputyGovE.htm 
[hereinafter Dr. Watanagase’s Presentation]. 
160
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 1.  Quotation provided is from the unofficial 
translation prepared by Baker & McKenzie courtesy of The Foreign Banks’ Association in Thailand, 
available at http://www.bot.or.th/bothomepage/notification/fsupv/EFipcs.asp. 
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establishment of an internal risk management structure.161  We will explore 
certain aspects in some of these areas to the extent of their relevance in 
achieving what the BOT sets out to achieve when faced with the challenge 
of rapid increases in credit card debts, which is to preempt the influx of 
cardholders that could cause future bad loan problems. 
The most relevant areas of the regulations for our analysis are the first 
two parts and a portion of part four in the above paragraph, which places a 
ceiling on the credit line for each cardholder.162  These regulatory areas 
directly respond to the goal the 2004 BOT Regulation set out to achieve:  
keeping the gate open only to credit-worthy borrowers and screening out 
likely defaulters.163 
The first part of the 2004 BOT Regulation restricts potential defaulters 
by setting clear financial criteria.  Primary account holders must 1) have an 
income not less than THB 15,000 per month or THB 180,000 per annum; 2) 
have a deposit at the card-issuing bank for the full amount of the approved 
credit line;164 or 3) if self-employed, have a deposit account with at least six 
months of documented, satisfactory cash flow at a qualified financial 
institution.165  These rules are designed to prevent a repeat of the 2002 credit 
card spike. 
The second part of the 2004 BOT Regulation imposes greater 
financial discipline upon both cardholders and card issuers.  The pertinent 
parts provide that 1) successful applicants who are cardholders from April 1, 
2004 (the “new cardholders”) must pay no less than ten percent of their total 
outstanding balance as a minimum for each installment; 2) existing 
cardholders prior to April 1, 2004 must pay no less than five percent of their 
total outstanding balance as a minimum for each installment;166 and 3) if a 
cardholder defaults on payment for more than three months from the due 
date, the card issuer shall immediately cancel the card.167 
                                           
161
 See Bank of Thailand, Official Letters from the Bank of Thailand to all commercial banks and 
non-bank credit card operators, Re: Dispatch of the Notification of the Bank of Thailand  Re: Rules, 
Procedures and Conditions to Undertake Credit Card Business of Credit Card Business Operators (Mar. 15, 
2005). 
162
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, §§ 4.2, 4.3, 4.7. 
163
 See id. § 1. 
164
 This criterion is not applied to non-bank card issuers.  See Bank of Thailand, Notification of the 
Bank of Thailand Re: Rules, Procedures and Conditions to Undertake Credit Card Business of Credit Card 
Business Operators § 4.3 (Mar. 4, 2005). 
165
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 4.3. 
166
 However, from April 1, 2007, they will be subject to the same 10% requirement as the new 
cardholders.  See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 4.5(1)(b). 
167
 See id. § 4.5. 
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The last relevant area of the 2004 BOT Regulation168 is found in 
Section 4.7(2).  This section imposes a ceiling for a credit line granted to a 
cardholder at five times the individual’s monthly average income, 169 or cash 
flow movement in the deposit accounts of qualified financial institutions of 
such cardholder (“Ceiling Rule”).170 
Again, using the objective of preemption as our yardstick, one of the 
first questions is whether the Ceiling Rule is sufficiently successful in 
getting the credit card issuers to create a better cardholder screening system 
for granting credit lines.171  Generally, the Ceiling Rule is deemed more 
prudent as a policy because it introduces a better regulatory environment 
than leaving the credit limit in the hands of card issuers to prescribe 
according to their different credit review practice, which was exactly the 
environment that existed prior to the 2004 BOT Regulation.172  In gauging 
whether the Ceiling Rule is successful beyond its general or theoretical 
application, some issues outside the scope of this Article may be worth 
addressing further.  These issues should include further examination of the 
following:  1) how customer credit information is shared among card issuers, 
and 2) how often the BOT requires the issuers to review such information 
because the Ceiling Rule relies on the card issuers’ sufficiently current 
knowledge of the status of average income or cash flow in deposit accounts 
                                           
168
 A couple of interesting issues are worth examining but are beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
instance, if the primary objective of the 2004 BOT Regulation is to preempt credit card problems in the 
future, does the different treatment accorded to existing and new cardholders help all holders to improve 
their payment behavior?  A further inquiry into the rule may be: what happens if cancelled cardholders 
attempt to reenter the system by applying for new credit cards?  While we do not think the current data is 
extensive enough to support the assessment required for answering the first question, there is no express 
provision in the 2004 BOT Regulation that will prevent an ex-defaulter applicant from reentering the 
system, if such applicant meets one of the conditions to enter the floodgate that we discussed earlier.  
Nevertheless, the sharing of credit information by the establishment of credit bureaus in Thailand, such as 
the Thai Credit Bureau, may render such practice less possible in actuality than from strictly interpreting 
the 2004 BOT Regulation. 
169
 As with the second area of relevant 2004 BOT Regulations sections previously discussed, the 
Ceiling Rule allows different treatments for existing cardholders, for whom the rule shall have become 
applicable in January 2005, as opposed to the new cardholders, who were subject to the rule in April 2004.  
One may also note that what separates the Ceiling Rule from the other two areas of the 2004 BOT 
Regulation that we have already discussed is that it is directed at the credit card issuers exclusively, as 
opposed to other regulated areas that may have an impact on the cardholders as well as credit card issuers.  
See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 4.7(2). 
170
 See id. 
171
 While there is little doubt to that having a ceiling is better than having no ceiling at all, it follows 
that a system that imposes a spending credit limit is inherently better in dealing with overspending than a 
system that lacks such a limit. 
172
 See Thitima Chucherd, The Effect of Household Debt on Consumption in Thailand, Bank of 
Thailand Discussion Paper, Apr. 2006, at 10. 
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of cardholders.173  On the second point, it should be noted that the BOT does 
not ignore the issue of information monitoring.  On the contrary, certain 
sections of the 2004 BOT Regulation require card issuers to establish an 
internal risk management system to evaluate and monitor their credit card 
accounts.174 
2. Personal Debt Restructuring Method: The Thai Ministry of Finance’s 
Bailout Effort 
On October 18, 2005, amid the similar environment of rising 
household debt that triggered the BOT to introduce the 2004 BOT 
Regulation, the MOF announced the PDRM, its measure to restructure the 
massive THB twenty-seven billion in consumer loan NPLs.  The Thai Prime 
Minister at the time, Mr. Thaksin Shinawatra, described the PDRM as a state 
tool to extend its helping hand to the last group in society to be helped.175  
Essentially, the PDRM is a debt restructuring program that cuts the principal 
amount in half and forgives all interest on personal debt owed by about 
100,000 qualified individual NPL borrowers, provided that such borrowers 
repay the rest of the principal within a defined period.176  Because it is a 
much simpler debt relief effort than South Korea’s IDRA, we will first 
describe its scope of applicability and a summary of its rules and procedural 
steps, and then we will explore several aspects of it in comparison to the 
IDRA.  Finally, we will conclude with a description of general reactions to 
the PDRM and some interesting anecdotes of moral hazard in the credit card 
market that seem to be inspired by the PDRM. 
First, unlike South Korea’s IDRA or Thailand’s 2004 BOT 
Regulation, the PDRM is not a law or regulation in the conventional sense.  
Our understanding of what constitutes a law may include a set of rules, 
introduced by way of legislative process or prescribed by a regulator such as 
the BOT, that sets out to regulate certain actions with binding effect, and will 
be enforced with penalties by an empowered administrative agency.  The 
PDRM, on the other hand, is a law in the sense that it is a request for 
cooperation from an administrative agency (in this case the MOF) to its 
regulated members (in this case a number of local banks, finance companies, 
and asset management companies).  Its function is to commonly develop a 
                                           
173
 Although such further examination is beyond the scope of this Article, it may nevertheless provide 
a more comprehensive evaluation of the Ceiling Rule in a broader context, such as how influential its role 
is as one of the many parts that constitute Thailand’s consumer credit policy. 
174
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, §§ 4.9(3), 4.10 (for banks), 4.9 (for non-bank issuers). 
175
 See Chudasri & Chantanusornsiri, supra note 22. 
176
 Id.  See also Chantanusornsiri, supra note 22. 
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consensus to adopt a measure, and once such consensus is reached the 
members will be bound by the rules of the adopted measure.177 
This is notable because of several distinctions with the 2004 BOT 
Regulation or the IDRA:  1) initial participation by the regulated members is 
voluntary; 2) the members participate actively with the regulator in arriving 
at the measure; and 3) the measure itself is not binding upon regulated 
members who do not choose to participate.178  Therefore, this makes the 
PDRM much more limited in several aspects when compared to the IDRA or 
other notifications issued by the MOF that have a binding effect on all 
members.179 
The PDRM qualification requirements for the loans are 1) each loan 
must be classified as a NPL as of June 30, 2005,180 and must not be an 
agricultural loan, housing loan, or credit card loan; 2) the loan must be 
originated by a participating financial institution; 3) the borrower must be a 
natural person; and 4) the borrower must be sued by the relevant creditor in 
court before July 1, 2005, and the outstanding principal balance of the loan 
of such borrower must not exceed THB 200,000 per financial institution.181 
Two options are open to individuals seeking to take advantage of the 
PDRM.  The debtor may pay half the outstanding balance by June 30, 2006, 
or the borrower may seek to refinance the same amount through the state-
owned Government Savings Bank (“GSB”).  If the GSB agrees to refinance 
                                           
177
 The PDRM expressly states in its introductory paragraph that it is a product of cooperation 
between the Ministry of Finance (“MOF”) and the participating financial institutions, whose names appear 
in the schedule to the PDRM.  See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
178
 In this instance, other financial institutions that are otherwise regulated by the MOF, but which 
chose not to participate in the PDRM, will not be bound by its rules. 
179
 The PDRM rules are brief (the notification is three pages in its entirety) and are organized into two 
parts.  The first part specifies the qualifications of loans that may enter the measure and the second part 
prescribes procedural steps that debtors possessing qualified loans must follow should they want to 
restructure such loans.  However, it is the limited application to some members of an MOF-regulated class 
that distinguishes the PDRM from other MOF notifications that require all members of such class to be in 
compliance, such as the MOF Notification Re: Rules, Procedures, and Conditions for Establishing a 
Commercial Bank, or the MOF Notification Re: Permission to Foreign Governments and Financial 
Institutions of Foreign Governments to Issue Baht Bonds or Debentures in Thailand.  See Press Release, 
Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005). 
180
 Technically, from the Thai regulatory point of view, NPLs are defaulted loans that the Bank of 
Thailand has classified as such by dividing them into different hierarchical categories depending on various 
factors, such as the length of time that has passed since their due dates, that should alert the lenders of their 
being potentially difficult to collect in order for the lenders to set aside reserved provision at the level as 
required by the Bank of Thailand.  The categories of loans classified as NPLs are 1) Loss, 2) Doubtful of 
Loss, 3) Doubtful, and 4) Substandard.  See Bank of Thailand, Notification of the Bank of Thailand Re: 
Worthless or Irrecoverable Assets and Doubtful Assets that may be Worthless or Irrecoverable of 
Commercial Banks, §§ 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 (Aug. 23, 2004); Bank of Thailand, Notification of the Bank of 
Thailand Re: Worthless or Irrecoverable Assets and Doubtful Assets that may be Worthless or 
Irrecoverable of Credit Finance Companies and Finance Companies, §§ 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
181
 See Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005), § 1. 
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half of the outstanding principal balance, then the debtor has until June 30, 
2009 to repay the GSB.  Successful repayment closes both the GSB loan and 
all debt owed to the original lender for that account.182 
Reactions to the PDRM were initially negative.  Once announced, it 
was instantly met with skepticism from virtually all the major local banks, 
which voiced concern that such a policy would create a moral hazard among 
borrowers.183  Another reason that may prompt banks to voice their concerns 
over the PDRM is that the measure will force banks to mark their loans to 
market value out of their own pockets.  In fact, the MOF has declared that 
the measure “will not require subsidy from the national budget because the 
PDRM is based on the principle of cooperation among commercial 
banks.”184 
As described earlier, the central thrust for the government in putting 
forth the PDRM is its conviction that since the 1997-98 Crisis, certain 
personal borrowers are victims of interest charges.  While this is a worthy 
and altruistic conviction, the impression that Thai borrowers may have been 
charged interest unfairly is not a point lost from the perspective of Thai 
borrowers.  On November 27, 2005 (approximately one month following the 
PDRM), the Foundation for Consumers, an influential Thai non-
governmental consumer organization group, advised a group of borrowers to 
default on their loans with the lender, a local micro-credit lending company 
named Easy Buy.185 
C. Individual Debtor Rehabilitation Act vs. Personal Debt Restructuring 
Measure: Comparing the South Korean and Thai Bailout Laws 
There are so many aspects of the Thai PDRM that differ from the 
South Korean IDRA that the only significant similarity may be that both are 
intended to bail out the borrowers.186  In order to better understand their 
                                           
182
 If the borrower chooses the first option but defaults on the specified payment, the restructure is 
terminated and the loan amount will be calculated as if the restructure has not been made.  See Press 
Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005), § 2.1.3. 
183
 See Chantanusornsiri & Chudasri, supra note 25. 
184
 This means that the banks would, on the one hand, accept the write-off for qualified borrowers 
while, on the other hand, continuing the negotiation with (and explaining the different treatment to) other 
borrowers who have been duly paying their loans, interest charges and all.  See Press Release, Ministry of 
Finance, No. 89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005), at 3. 
185
 The strategy outlined by the Foundation for Consumers is for the borrowers to defend their case in 
court on grounds that include illegally high interest rate charges.  See NGO to Challenge High Interest 
Rates in Court, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 5, 2005; Preeyanat Phanayanggoor, 20 More Easy Buy Complaints to 
Police, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 28, 2005. 
186
 The only analogy the authors can come up with to casually compare the PDRM to the IDRA is 
that the PDRM is a physically smaller, more distant relative to the IDRA.  The IDRA is much bigger and 
more resourceful with influence to help more of the targeted class of people. 
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differences, important characteristics of each system will be compared here.  
First, the purpose and means to arrive at the rules to help debtors are 
different.  While the IDRA is directed at customers who overspent in the 
wake of the Korean government’s 1999 initiatives, the PDRM aims to help 
individuals who suffered from substantial interest accruing on their debts as 
a direct result of the 1997-98 Crisis. 187   Furthermore, the IDRA is a 
legislative act while the PDRM relies on consensus building between the 
MOF and its regulated members. 
The second major difference between the two bailout measures is 
obvious and related to their different purposes that we discussed above.  The 
scope of applicability of the IDRA is much wider than that of the PDRM.  
This includes different qualifications for eligible debt as well as differences 
in types of debt.  For instance, the covered amount in the two measures 
differs substantially.188  In addition, the IDRA is primarily aimed at debt 
obligations owed to private individuals, whereas the PDRM covers only 
certain types of debts owed to participating financial institutions.189 
The third and final major difference that this Article will highlight is 
the procedural nature of both measures.  Where the South Korean IDRA has 
an elaborate committee reviewing applications from debtors and requires the 
local court’s judgment with respect to the IDRA’s applicability to certain 
qualified applicants, Thailand’s PDRM procedure is a less formal, out-of-
court restructuring that resembles private workouts rather than the 
bankruptcy procedure-like process of the IDRA. 190   For instance, the 
repayment time frame for the IDRA restructuring could go on for eight years 
while the PDRM provides a three year deadline for repayment.191 
                                           
187
 Outside the text of the PDRM, a telling statement with respect to the purpose of PDRM may also 
be found in the comment by the Finance Minister Dr. Thanong Bidaya:  “Eight years of inaction and no 
solutions have resulted in a huge interest burden of 300% higher than the loan principal combined.”  
Chantanusornsiri, supra note 22. 
188
 Compare the whopping USD 500,000 per account coverage of the IDRA for unsecured debts to 
the maximum of USD 5000 per account coverage of the PDRM for qualified debts.  Even adjusted to the 
300% increase in accrued interest the amount still pales in comparison to that offered under the IDRA.  See 
id. 
189
 Even in this instance, the PDRM further narrows its application to exclude specific types of debts 
that may otherwise have qualified, such as agricultural loans, mortgage loans, and credit card loans. 
190
 It is important to note another procedural difference between the IDRA and the PDRM because it 
also relates to their different purposes and the scopes of applicability.  Unlike the PDRM which is intended 
to be a one-time restructuring opportunity and therefore provides deadlines for eligible borrowers to contact 
participating lenders, the IDRA does not typically impose a specific deadline for this purpose.  The main 
implication from this procedural aspect is that qualified individual debtors cannot benefit from the PDRM 
if they do not apply for it by the prescribed deadlines. 
191
 This refers to Section 2.2.5 of the PDRM that sets the repayment maturity date for debtors to repay 
the Government Saving Bank to be no later than June 30, 2009.  Press Release, Ministry of Finance, No. 
89/2548 (Oct. 18, 2005), § 2.2.5. 
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In the next section, we will analyze the impact of bailing out in 
general, and specifically as it is applicable to the IDRA.  We will also 
occasionally provide comparative information regarding the differences 
between the Korean and Thai bailing out laws as well as the differences 
between the preemptive and bailout methods that the two governments have 
implemented. 
V. THE EFFECTS OF CONSUMER BAILOUT INTERVENTION VS. PREEMPTIVE 
INTERVENTION 
Given the notable scope and mandate of related debt relief programs 
in both Thailand and South Korea addressed in this Article, this section 
analyzes the potential winners and losers of such bailout laws.  It then 
assesses each country’s legal and policy frameworks by comparing the 
bailout approach taken by the IDRA and the PDRM with the preemption 
approach taken by the 2004 BOT Regulation.  We conclude that the 
preemption method may be a better regulatory approach in coping with 
credit card related NPLs because it more effectively manages relevant 
delinquency rates, does not pass NPL costs to the taxpayers, and is more in 
line with the desired role of a government that pursues a policy of minimal 
market intervention, thus averting the related downsides of moral hazard. 
A. The Winners and Losers from the Bailout Approach 
For South Korea, in our view, the notable potential winners are 1) 
qualified individual debtors who are effectively being “bailed out” of debt 
pursuant to the IDRA;192 2) foreign financial institutions that may be eager 
                                           
192
 In practice, the number of debtors seeking credit card bailouts has increased since the IDRA’s 
introduction in September 2004, with the total number of applicants for IDRA or IDRA-type debt rescue 
programs at approximately 38,828, with the government reviewing an average of 4000 applications every 
month for such programs.  See Ji-young Kwan & Chung-un Cho, Over 20,000 Debtors Rescued in First 
Year of Court Bailout, KOREA HERALD, Sept. 23, 2005, available at http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/ 
SITE/data/html_dir/2005/09/23/200509230033.asp.  Most IDRA applicants are between ages 40 and 49 
(31.7%), with 60.2% of debtors being men and 39.8% women.  Id.  The cumulative average debt range is 
from 50 million to 100 million won, with “business failure” being given as the main reason for such 
individual bankruptcy cases.  Id.  Most directly relating to this Article, credit card bills represented the 
largest proportion of individual debt within such programs, representing about 59.8% of total individual 
average debt under such programs.  Id. 
At first blush, these numbers may appear to give IDRA some credibility in terms of resolving South 
Korea’s credit card bankruptcy binge spending hangover.  However, the IDRA and its related programs 
failed to meet expectations for several reasons.  First, before the IDRA, the Korean Supreme Court 
expected more than 10,000 defaulters per month to register, but less than half that number of applications 
were received by the court in 2004 (the first year of the IDRA’s implementation).  Second, the numbers 
clearly demonstrate that debtors in default prefer to pursue private debt counseling programs, such as the 
Credit Counseling & Recovery Service (“CCRS”) which has received up to 20,000 applications, rather than 
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to purchase KRW-denominated NPLs for future upside (which Table 3 
below addresses); 3) Korean institutions which will be able to receive 
injected public funds into their balance sheets vis-à-vis the IDRA; and 4) 
from a political perspective, the ruling political parties such as the South 
Korean Uri political party that helped to push the IDRA into passage on 
September 23, 2004.  The potential losers may be the Korean taxpayers, who 
are effectively paying for the bailout of individual credit card debtors under 
the IDRA, and perhaps also the reputation of the Korean financial 
infrastructure due to the “moral hazard” concern discussed herein.193 
This analysis applies to Thailand’s PDRM and the parties involved in 
the Thai bailout measure as well, with two notable exceptions.  First, foreign 
buyers of Thai consumer NPLs may not particularly benefit from the PDRM 
because the payoff under qualified loans will be substantially decreased as a 
result of the PDRM 50% write-off.  Plus, such buyers who bought the loans 
prior to the announcement of the PDRM may already have in place private 
workout agreements with the borrowers of NPLs in their portfolio, which 
could have provided an even further discount of principal as compared to the 
50% offered by the PDRM.194  Second, unlike the IDRA, the PDRM does 
not use the state budget to fund the balance sheets of the financial 
                                                                                                                              
the public court system linked to the IDRA program.  Id.  CCRS is much less costly (requiring a fee of 
KRW 50,000, or about USD 48) compared to IDRA’s complex court-guided paperwork structure, which 
typically requires legal assistance amounting to an extra KRW 1-2 million (USD 1000-2000).  Third, the 
IDRA process is both cumbersome and slow, often taking several months for the court to accept or reject an 
individual debtor’s rescue plan. 
Moreover, if an individual consumer had overdue debts of KRW 300,000 for three months, such a 
person would be classified as a “credit delinquent” and would thereafter be placed on the creditor “black 
list” of the financial institutions.  When an individual is deemed a “credit delinquent,” the information 
would be kept by relevant financial institutions for a year.  As the IDRA effectively “rescues” (or bails out) 
a debtor from debt, the IDRA applicant may effectively be rescued and thus avoid the notorious title of 
“credit delinquent,” and delay or lower the likelihood of being placed on the “black list” used by Korean 
financial institutions.  See Kim Dong-ho, Park Sung-ha, Credit Black List Goes; New System Come In, 
JOONGANG DAILY, Apr. 24, 2005, available at http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200504/24/200504242241 
080279900090509052.html. 
193
 The issue of “moral hazard” can be evidenced in theory and practice in the South Korean case.  
For example, from late 2004, following the IDRA’s passage and various government official statements 
relating to individual debt assistance programs, debtor payments have dropped.  For example, the Credit 
Recovery Committee reported that as of mid-December 2004, the number of debt adjustment applicants 
exceeded 1000 per day.  However, following Finance Minister Lee Hun-Jai’s January 7, 2005 statement 
that the ministry may exempt certain principal debts owed, the debt restructuring plan’s applicant levels 
dropped to 400 the next day.  Further, an average of 4000 consulting cases existed in November 2004 
(following IDRA’s September 2004 passage).  This number dropped to 476 on January 8 (the day 
following Finance Minister Lee’s comments).  Taken from a big picture purview, this signals that debtors 
are waiting longer to repay debt obligations hoping that “they will receive some sort of benefit” for 
possibly making payments at some point in the future rather than now.  See Wohn Dong-hee, Debtors 
Abandon Payments, JOONGANG DAILY NEWSPAPER, Jan. 17, 2005, at 3. 
194
 This is because Thai NPLs were purchased already at values deemed heavily discounted from the 
FRA sales. 
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institutions in order to subsidize its measure.195  Nevertheless, we find the 
moral hazard issue to be a critical concern shared by both countries. 
 
Table 3.  NPL Levels in Korea from 1998 to 2001.196 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total NPLs 
(trillion KRW) 118 88 64.6 39.1 
B. Bailout vs. Preemption: A Case for Limited Market Intervention? 
A balancing of considerations can be used to determine what makes 
such bailout laws beneficial or detrimental, with reference to the relevant 
arguments for and against bailing out individual credit card debtors pursuant 
to the IDRA.  As the PDRM does not bail out credit card debtors, we will 
only refer to that measure occasionally in the limited context of discussing 
the pros and cons of bailout laws in general.  Where appropriate, we will 
also include discussions of some aspects of the 2004 BOT Regulation as a 
representative method of preemption that could be employed as a policy 
option, as compared to the bailout policy represented by the IDRA. 
In South Korea, the IDRA was originally passed by the National 
Assembly based on the assumption that the benefits of action outweighed the 
costs of inaction in relation to the Korean credit card crisis.  Korean 
legislators, in other words, feared that action could potentially be more 
detrimental than inaction, from both an economic and social perspective.197  
                                           
195
 Therefore, from a theoretical purview, the public funds do not suffer and the Thai taxpayers are in 
better shape than their Korean counterparts.  It is worthwhile to note, however, that the institution specified 
in the PDRM to provide refinance loans is a state-owned bank, the Government Saving Bank.  However, 
considering the gravity of taxpayer burden, the amounts restructured under the PDRM are still much 
smaller than those under the IDRA. 
196
 See Korea Asset Management Corporation, http://www.kamco.or.kr/data/report/img/ 
200411report07_06.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2007). 
197
 The negative social (separate from economic) ramifications included increased reported cases of 
suicide, insurance fraud, and prostitution, among others.  In addition, what may have been a primary driver 
behind such debt relief actions was the fear that not doing anything could result in a financial crisis, similar 
to the 1997-98 Crisis.  To work backwards, there is an argument that a possible financial crisis could be 
based on the sheer size and scope of individual credit card debt that existed in Korea, especially after 2002.  
Such credit card debt is effectively a loan with high interest rates (usually ranging from twenty to twenty-
five percent) that should be repaid to the lending institution, usually a domestic credit card company or 
financial institution.  Thus if such debt is not repaid, this leads to a net loss equal to the expected original 
loan amount (principal) plus interest (expected profit from issuing the line of credit). 
If only the principal is repaid, then this in theory should amount to a neutral transaction, whereby 
neither upside nor downside is realized.  However, if both principal (in part or full) and interest are not 
fully repaid, then a net loss exists within the balance sheet of the lending institution.  For example, if 
lending institution A (lendor) lends USD 100 equivalent to lendee B with a twenty percent interest rate 
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The aggregate effect of the amount of individual credit card defaulters could 
place an extreme amount of stress upon the nation’s financial 
infrastructure.198  Thus, if such lending institutions begin to fail—as in the 
case of LG Card,199 formerly Korea’s largest credit card company—then this 
could lead to a crisis of confidence in the financial sector.  Because lending 
institutions are critical to the viability of the Korean economy, which is 
largely driven by the growth of large conglomerates known as chaebol,200 
the fall of one lending institution may potentially lead to a chain reaction.201  
This scenario could then ultimately lead to a 1929-type run on banks and a 
massive diminishment of credit onshore.  Such an event would stifle the 
Korean economy and potentially plunge the eleventh largest global economy 
back into another crisis reminiscent of the 1997-98 Crisis.202 
In Thailand, as discussed in our analysis in the previous section, a 
major objective of the 2004 BOT Regulation was to cope with the rapid 
growth of individual credit card debt in 2002 by creating a precautionary and 
                                                                                                                              
charge, then lendor expects USD 100 (principal only) to USD 120 (principal plus interest) on its asset side 
of the balance sheet.  Anything less will result in lost expected revenue, which hurts the financial viability 
of lending institution A. 
198
 “The high risk of family credit default means that the nation's economy is still ailing amid ever-
decreasing corporate investment, rising unemployment, intensifying labor disputes and rampant real estate 
speculation.”  See Seriousness of Family Debts–Top Bureaucrats Appear Too Optimistic, KOREA TIMES, 
Nov. 7, 2003.  Also, the IMF argued that South Korea's economic rebound has been hampered by a host of 
problems, including huge debts incurred by credit card firms, and also pointed out a downside risk for the 
Korean economy as consumption could be weighed down by heavy household debt. Moreover, the IMF 
warned of the risk of moral hazard relating to credit delinquencies due to the credit card crisis.  See Cho 
Hyoung-kwon, IMF Warns of Moral Hazard of Credit Delinquents, KOREA TIMES, May 30, 2004, 
available at http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=imf++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/ 
biz/200405/kt2004053015303611870.htm&media=kt. 
199
 In April 2004, Samsung Electronics spent nearly KRW 600 billion to bail out its affiliate, 
Samsung Card Co., Korea’s largest credit card issuer.  Thereafter, Samsung Card Co. stated in January 
2005 that it would raise KRW 1.2 trillion (USD 1.2 billion) by selling shares to its group affiliate, Samsung 
Electronics.  Altogether, these actions by Samsung Electronics represented two notable bailouts in one 
year.  The funding structure was devised such that Samsung Card Co. sold 240 million new shares at KRW 
5,000 per share in March 2005.  Individuals and Samsung Card employees own a combined 11.7% stake in 
Samsung Card Co.  See $1.2 Billion Bailout for Card Firm, JOONGANG DAILY, Jan. 29, 2005, at 3. 
200
 The four major credit card companies in Korea are Samsung Card Co., LG Card Co., Shinhan 
Card Co., and BC Card Co.  Among these four, the first two credit card companies–Samsung and LG–are 
the two largest conglomerates in the Korean economy.  See LG Card's Liquidity Crisis, KOREA TIMES, 
Nov. 23, 2003. 
201
 From this perspective, South Korea’s legislative attempt represented a reactionary attempt to send 
a message to the markets that, first, the government recognized this potential risk, and second, that the 
language embedded in the IDRA, which would mitigate such potential events from occurring, would in turn 
restore confidence back to the onshore markets. 
202
 See generally Borensztein & Lee, supra note 76, at 5-9 (discussing the monetary causes of the 
South Korean “credit crunch”).  For a slightly more theoretical view on credit rationing effects, see Joseph 
E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
393 (1981). 
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preventive set of rules.203  The approach taken by the BOT, therefore, is 
different from the approach taken by the IDRA in many respects.  First, 
unlike that of South Korea, the Thai credit card market had not reached the 
level of crisis at the time the BOT launched the 2004 BOT Regulation.  Thus, 
the 2004 BOT Regulation was launched in the spirit of anticipating a 
potential crisis rather than as a reactionary stance to rescue institutional 
lenders, as in the IDRA’s case.204  Second, the 2004 BOT Regulation is 
procedurally very different from the IDRA because it is not a debt relief 
measure and therefore does not apply directly to borrowers, but instead is 
applicable to the card issuers.205  In addition, and perhaps most importantly, 
the 2004 BOT Regulation is distinguishable from South Korea’s IDRA in 
that it has not introduced the issue of moral hazard to the credit market.  This 
is because the 2004 BOT Regulation does not attempt to restructure the 
debts by placing an additional factor in the debtor-creditor relationship, 
which in the IDRA’s case is the local court.206 
Assuming that the IDRA and 2004 BOT Regulation, reduced to their 
most simplistic forms, both represent “market intervention” efforts by the 
South Korean and Thai governments, then the previous paragraph may have 
extolled the purposes and merits of why a government may need to interfere 
with the market mechanism in the credit card industry.  Government 
intervention opponents have several counterarguments.  The first argument 
is that bailing out individual credit card holders creates moral hazard, which 
effectively creates an incentive for individuals to spend recklessly again in 
the future, with little or no fear of the consequences related to debtor default 
simply because such debtors will expect to be bailed out again by the 
government at the taxpayers’ expense.207  This was also the major concern of 
Thai commercial banks when the PDRM was announced.208 
                                           
203
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 1.  See also Dr. Watanagase’s Presentation, supra 
note 159, at 5. 
204
 See 2004 BOT Regulation, supra note 17, § 1.  The BOT’s efforts were in reaction to the 
outstanding balance buildup rather than to a crisis triggered by concerns over the well-being of lenders. 
205
 See id. § 3 (Scope of Application). 
206
 Although § 4.6 of the 2004 BOT Regulation prescribes rules for banks to follow when banks need 
to change the category of debts, the 2004 BOT Regulation does not create a different process of repayment 
for credit card borrowers as separated from other types of borrowers.  In other words, it is less likely to be 
compared with a bankruptcy law than the IDRA. 
207
 As a matter of practice separate from theory, government action to relieve the debts of individuals 
caused credit delinquents to make less of an effort to pay what they owed.  After the government 
announced on January 7, 2005 that the Ministry of Finance and Economy would look into exempting the 
principal debts, debts adjustment consulting requests to the Credit Recovery Committee fell from average 
4000 a day in November 2004 to 476 on January 8, 2005.  See Wohn, supra note 193, at 3. 
208
 A representative quote showing the banks’ concern comes from Khunying Jada Wattanasiritham, 
then president and CEO of Siam Commercial Bank and also the Chairman of the Thai Bankers’ 
Association.  Ms. Wattanasiritham stated “[t]he message sent by the government is unclear and some may 
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The second argument is that such legislation may send a dangerous 
signal to the markets that the government sees within its purview the notion 
of acting as constant market surveyor.209  In other words, the fear is that the 
government has become an overly intrusive market regulator that stifles 
rather than spurs free market behavior, transparency, and investment.  
Investors should be free to enter into every transaction on the basis of caveat 
emptor.210  In such an overly regulated market environment, related risks 
exist as well.211  These risks include inaccuracies of information, lags in 
receiving information, 212  and lack of needed information in relation to 
setting forth such legislation. 
Further, related to the traditional Keynesian economic perspective is 
the notion that the role of government should be as active protector of 
national financial interests.213  More specifically, the government can and 
should play a very hands-on management role over the public’s consumption 
patterns to help mitigate actual, threatened, or real market failures, and instill 
public confidence that a watchful force exists to protect consumers against 
financial turbulence or crisis. 214   One argument for a legislatively 
interventionist approach is that most, if not nearly all, of the credit card users 
                                                                                                                              
think that if they have debts, they should not repay them as they can seek government help later.  If people 
think like this, it’s a danger for the whole banking system.”  Chantanusornsiri & Chudasri, supra note 25.  
Considering Ms. Wattanasiritham’s distinguished professional career, which started at the BOT, there is 
little room for doubt that this is her candid reaction. 
209
 The main problem in this scenario is that such instant price deflation towards a certain designated 
level would be chosen not by the markets, as in most developed nations, but by government bureaucrats. 
210
 “Let the buyer beware.” 
211
 If the government sends out signals that it is in the business of acting as a market commentator, 
then the country’s public policy is to create a nation overly dependent on the government as it relates to 
individual investment decisions. 
212
 One of the well-known examples on incomplete information is “the parable of separate islands.”  
This concept was first introduced by Edmund Phelps.  See generally, EDMUND S. PHELPS ET AL., THE 
MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION THEORY (W.W. Norton 1970).  Robert 
Lucas used this parable to explain the concept of incomplete information.  In his explanation, Lucas 
imagined an economy with one single business unit based on a separate island, with no knowledge of what 
happens on other islands.  Lacking information, investors based on the separate island can make incorrect 
investment decisions.  Therefore, incomplete information may increase risk much more than expected.  See 
generally MARTIN NEIL BAILY & PHILIP FRIEDMAN, MACROECONOMICS, FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL SECTOR 468 (2d ed. 1995). 
213
 Regarding Keynesian economic theory, “[t]he fundamental lesson of Keynesian economics is that 
the automatic adjustment mechanism of competition cannot be relied upon to achieve such policy 
objectives as full employment and price stability.  The main message of Keynesian economists is that the 
automatic adjustment process of the market is too unreliable to serve as a practical basis of full-
employment policy.”  MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 671 (5th ed. 1997-98). 
214
 However, after the 1997 Korean economic crisis, some academics blamed the government-led 
economic development as the main reason for the economic crisis, and claimed that market-oriented 
economic development would be necessary to overcome the economic crisis and to develop the Korean 
economy further.  See Uk Heo & Sunwoong Kim, Financial Crisis in South Korea: Failure of 
Government-Led Development Paradigm, 40 ASIAN SURV. 492 (2000). 
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relating to the Korean credit card crisis are domestic, and that such Korean 
domestic investors have a relatively shorter history of personal credit card 
expenditure.215  For the Thai credit card market, one of the illustrative events 
relating to this issue is the historical seventy-six percent year-on-year 
increase in total credit card debt in 2002 as a result of the relaxation of the 
minimum income requirement.  Another example that supports the notion of 
government as an active protector for Thailand is that the rate of year-on-
year growth of total credit card debt has been decreasing since the BOT 
reinstated the original minimum income requirement and, for the first time, 
assumed its role as the regulator of the non-bank credit card companies in 
November 2002. 
Balancing both sides of the argument,216 limited and narrowly tailored 
government action may prove the best equilibrium policy solution as it 
relates to South Korea’s and Thailand’s credit card issue.  The markets are 
interfered with less by both governments taking a narrowly focused view, 
and the governments will also be in a better position to instill investor 
confidence. 217 
This limited intervention approach seems to be reflected more in the 
preemptive method of the 2004 BOT Regulation than the bailout laws seen 
in the IDRA or the PDRM.  This is because the BOT anticipated the risk of 
foreseeable financial problems (i.e., excessive buildup of credit card debts) 
by launching the 2004 BOT Regulation to preempt such problems and 
improve the credit screening system.  The 2004 BOT Regulation also has the 
advantage of being a low-profile protective regulation, as opposed to a high-
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 Personal investors are also referred to as “retail investors.”  See FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO 
MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 14 (2d ed., Prentice Hall 1996).  
Fabozzi notes the trend in capital markets away from dominance by retail investors to institutional 
investors, the latter being more willing to invest across borders in both developed and developing capital 
markets.  Id. 
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 On the other hand, even assuming that a relatively short credit card usage history exists with South 
Korean consumers, the underlying principle should exist that such consumers are free to choose what they 
can or cannot purchase and, moreover, should bear some or all of the responsibility for their fiscal 
consumption behavior, whether it be prudent or reckless.  Similarly, who then should be held responsible if 
the IDRA does not have the intended effect of creating a “soft landing” for uncontrolled credit card debt?  
If the answer is that the fault still lies on the individual spender, per the principle of caveat emptor, then 
little rationale exists for the IDRA in the first place because the policy would merely shift massive credit 
card debt from one class (the original credit card debtors) to another class (the taxpayers). 
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 However, market intervention of the Korean government is considered a factor that has a negative 
effect on the Korean economy.  The IMF said in a statement that the “Korean economy is better guided by 
market principles thanks to reduced government intervention in recent years.”  Sim Sung-tae, IMF Sees 
Rebound in Korean Economy by Early Next Year, KOREA HERALD, Oct. 29, 2004, at 7.  Further, less risk 
exists that the proposed legislation may overshoot or undershoot its objectives, triggering a potential 
negative financial blip or, in a more extreme case, a potential mass sell-off in the Korean financial markets.  
Instead, the focus could instead be placed on improving credit history checks on individuals applying for 
credit cards, and on improving risk management of credit lending institutions. 
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profile legislative protection, and therefore may be less susceptible to 
causing a negative financial blip relative to the IDRA. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The apparent negative externalities of the credit card spending binge 
in South Korea and Thailand and the subsequent hangover have recently 
been met with strong market intervention by both governments.  In South 
Korea, this intervention was in the form of the IDRA, and in Thailand in the 
form of the 2004 BOT Regulation.  The potential benefits of such legislation 
are that a massive influx of taxpayer capital will be reallocated to bail out 
credit card debtors in order to avoid the perceived potential of a rapidly 
downward spiraling financial infrastructure that could potentially mirror the 
1997-98 Crisis.  The potential downside is that legislation, such as the IDRA, 
may lead to moral hazard risks whereby consumers will be given an 
incentive, or alternatively, little disincentive to not spend recklessly.  
Separate but related to this, valuable taxpayer revenue could instead be used 
for potentially more beneficial purposes if allocated elsewhere. 
Despite the apparent merits of the IDRA, the most practical solution 
for South Korea’s post 1997-98 Crisis credit card hangover should not be 
significant government intervention (as clear signals of market failure do not 
yet exist) that may trigger moral hazard risk and thus more reckless debt 
spending, either now or in the future.  Rather, the solution should be to not 
implement such market interventionist legislation due to the relatively 
greater downsides of spurring moral hazard relative to the potential upsides 
of bailing out individual debtors. 
For Thailand, the 2004 BOT Regulation may not provide a direct 
solution for, or even a best model to address, the overspending problems, but 
may prove more effective as an example of a preemptive measure, as 
opposed to a bailout measure.  At the same time, strong efforts should be 
made to implement sound long-term risk management so that lines of credit 
are given only to those individuals that have a relatively low probability of 
defaulting on payment.  By applying this approach, the financial 
infrastructures of post 1997-98 South Korea and Thailand can become both 
more flexible and crisis-resistant.218 
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 At the same time, this will signal to other financial players the respect for market fundamentals in 
South Korea and Thailand, both in theory and in practice. 
